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DOES UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL BIAS AFFECT
TRIAL JUDGES?
Jeffreyj Rachlinski,* Sheri Lynn Johnsont AndrewJ Wistrich,4 &
Chris Guthriet
Race matters in the criminal justice system. Black defendants appear to
fare worse than similarly situated white defendants. Why? Implicit bias is one
possibility. Researchers, using a well-known measure called the Implicit Associ-
ation Test, have found that most white Americans harbor implicit bias toward
black Americans. Do judges, who are professionally committed to egalitarian
norms, hold these same implicit biases? And if so, do these biases account for
racially disparate outcomes in the criminal justice system? We explored these
two research questions in a multi-part study involving a large sample of trial
judges drawn from around the country. Our results-which are both discour-
aging and encouraging-raise profound issues for courts and society. We find
that judges harbor the same kinds of implicit biases as others; that these biases
can influence their judgment; but that given sufficient motivation, judges can
compensate for the influence of these biases.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice is not blind.
Researchers have found that black defendants fare worse in court
than do their white counterparts. In a study of bail-setting in Con-
necticut, for example, Ian Ayres and Joel Waldfogel found thatjudges
set bail at amounts that were twenty-five percent higher for black
defendants than for similarly situated white defendants.' In an analy-
sis of judicial decisionmaking under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, David Mustard found that federal judges imposed sentences on
black Americans that were twelve percent longer than those imposed
on comparable white defendants.2 Finally, research on capital punish-
ment shows that "killers of White victims are more likely to be sen-
tenced to death than are killers of Black victims" and that "Black
defendants are more likely than White defendants" to receive the
death penalty."
Understanding why racial disparities like these and others persist
in the criminal justice system is vital. Only if we understand why black
defendants fare less well than similarly situated white defendants can
we determine how to address this deeply troubling problem.
Two potential sources of disparate treatment in court are explicit
bias and implicit bias. 4 By explicit bias, we mean the kinds of bias that
people knowingly-sometimes openly-embrace. Explicit bias exists
and undoubtedly accounts for many of the racial disparities in the
criminal justice system, but it is unlikely to be the sole culprit.
Researchers have found a marked decline in explicit bias over time,
even as disparities in outcomes persist.5
Implicit bias-by which we mean stereotypical associations so sub-
tle that people who hold them might not even be aware of them-also
appears to be an important source of racial disparities in the criminal
1 Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting,
46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 992 (1994). To calculate this disparity, Ayres and Waldfogel
controlled for eleven other variables, but they conceded that they might still be miss-
ing one or more omitted variables that might explain the differential. Id. By compar-
ing differences in both bond rates and bail rates, however, they were able to provide
even more compelling evidence that the bail rate differences they observed were race-
based. Id. at 993.
2 David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence
from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001).
3 R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal
Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2006).
4 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REv.
969, 969-70 (2006) (providing examples of both explicit and implicit bias).
5 See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, BLACK PRIDE AND BLACK PREJUDICE
6-8 (2002).
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justice system. 6 Researchers have found that most people, even those
who embrace nondiscrimination norms, hold implicit biases that
might lead them to treat black Americans in discriminatory ways. 7 If
implicit bias is as common among judges as it is among the rest of the
population, it might even account for more of the racially disparate
outcomes in the criminal justice system than explicit bias.
In this Article, we report the results of the first study of implicit
racial bias among judges. We set out to explore whether judges hold
implicit biases to the same extent the general population and to deter-
mine whether those biases correlate with their decisionmaking in
court. Our results are both alarming and heartening:
(1) Judges hold implicit racial biases.
(2) These biases can influence their judgment.
(3) Judges can, at least in some instances, compensate for their
implicit biases.
Our Article proceeds as follows. We begin, in Part I, by introduc-
ing the research on implicit bias and its impact on behavior. In Part
II, we briefly describe the methods of our study. We provide a much
more detailed account in the Appendix. In Part III, we report our
results and interpret them. Finally, in Part IV, we explore the implica-
tions of our results for the criminal justice system, identifying several
possible measures for combating implicit racial bias.
I. IMPLICIT BIAS
Psychologists have proposed that implicit biases might be respon-
sible for many of the continuing racial disparities in society., To
assess the extent to which implicit biases account for racial disparities,
researchers must first ascertain whether people hold implicit biases
and then determine the extent to which implicit biases influence their
actions.
6 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foun-
dations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 951, 961 (2006) ("[E]vidence that implicit attitudes pro-
duce discriminatory behavior is already substantial and will continue to accumulate."
(footnote omitted)); Kirstin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 427, 433 (2007) (calling implicit social cognitions "robust" and
"pervasive").
7 SeeJerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision
of "Affirmative Action, "94 CAL. L. REv. 1063, 1065 (2006) (arguing that implicit bias
shows that affirmative action programs are necessary to address "discrimination in the
here and now" (emphasis omitted)).
8 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1512 (2005).
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A. Demonstrating Implicit Bias
In their efforts to assess whether people harbor implicit biases,
psychologists have used a variety of methods. 9 Standing front and
center among these methods, however, is the Implicit Association Test
(IAT).' 0 Developed by a research group led largely by Tony Green-
wald, Mahzarin Banaji, and Brian Nosek, the LAT is the product of
decades of research on the study of bias and stereotypes" and has
attracted enormous scholarly and popular attention. 12 More than
four and a half million people have taken the IAT.' 3 The test takes
different forms, but most commonly, it consists of a computer-based
sorting task in which study participants pair words and faces. A typical
administration of the "Race IAT" proceeds as follows' 4:
First, researchers present participants with a computer screen
that has the words "White or Good" in the upper left-hand corner of
the screen and "Black or Bad" in the upper right. The researchers
then inform the participants that one of four types of stimuli will
appear in the center of the screen: white people's faces, black peo-
ple's faces, good (positive) words, or bad (negative) words. The
researchers then explain that the participants should press a desig-
nated key on the left side of the computer when a white face or a good
word appears and press a designated key on the right side of the com-
puter when a black face or a bad word appears. Researchers refer to
the white/good and black/bad pairings as "stereotype congruent,"
9 In addition to the Implicit Association Test, which we discuss in detail,
researchers have used subliminal priming techniques, see, e.g., Sandra Graham &
Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 483, 487-88 (2004); reaction-time studies, see, e.g., Greenwald & Krieger,
supra note 6, at 950-53 (labeling studies of implicit bias as studies of biases in reaction
times); and novel brain-imaging techniques, see, e.g., Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Per-
formance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12J. COGNI-
TIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 729-30 (2000).
10 Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231,
1231-32 (2007).
11 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 952.
12 See, e.g., Michael Orey, White Men Can't Help It, Bus. WK., May 15, 2006, at 54
(discussing the role of expert witness testimony on "unconscious bias theory" in gen-
der and race employment discrimination cases); Diane Cole, Don't Race to Judgment,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 26, 2005/Jan. 2, 2006, at 90.
13 See Project Implicit, General Information, http://www.projectimplicit.net/
generalinfo.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) ("Visitors have completed more than 4.5
million demonstration tests since 1998, currently averaging over 15,000 tests com-
pleted each week.").
14 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 952-53 (describing the basic IAT
technique).
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because they are consistent with negative stereotypes associated with
black Americans. 15 The participants complete several trials of this
first task.
Then, the computer is programmed to switch the spatial location
of "good" and "bad" so that the words "White or Bad" appear in the
upper left-hand corner and "Black or Good" appear in the upper
right. The researchers explain to the participants that they are now
supposed to press a designated key on the left side of the keyboard
when a white face or a bad word appears and press a designated key
on the right side of the keyboard when a black face or a good word
appears. Researchers refer to these white/bad and black/good pair-
ings as "stereotype-incongruent," because they are inconsistent with
the negative stereotypes associated with black Americans. The partici-
pants then complete several trials of this second task. 16
Researchers have consistently found that white Americans
express a strong "white preference" on the LAT.17 They make this
determination by comparing the amount of time it takes respondents
to complete the two tasks identified above-that is, their "response
latency."1 8 Most white Americans complete the first task (in which
they sort white and good from black and bad) more quickly than the
second (in which they sort black and good from white and bad). 19 In
other words, most white Americans produce higher response latencies
when faced with the stereotype-incongruent pairing (white/bad or
black/good) than when faced with the stereotype- congruent pairing
(white/good or black/bad).
Researchers have observed a different pattern of implicit biases
among black Americans. Black Americans do not exhibit the same
white preference that whites express, but neither do they show a mir-
ror-image black preference. 20 Rather, black Americans express a
much greater variation, with many expressing moderate to strong
black preferences that are rarely found in white Americans. 21 But
15 See Online Psychology Laboratory, Implicit Association Test (Race), http://
opl.apa.org/Experiments/About/AboudATRace.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
16 See id.
17 See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (reporting data indicating
that white adults taking the IAT strongly favored the white/good versus the black/bad
pairing on the IAT).
18 Id. at 104.
19 Id. at 105.
20 Id.
21 Id. Throughout, we adopt the convention that a "strong" bias means a ten-
dency to favor one pairing over another on the IAT by over three-quarters of a stan-
dard deviation, a "small" bias means an effect of less than one-quarter of a standard
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some also express white preferences-sometimes even strong ones.22
On average, black Americans express a slight white preference, but
the average masks wide variation in response.23 Latinos also express a
small white preference. Asian Americans show a white preference
that is comparable to but somewhat weaker than that found in white
Americans. 24
The implications of the research using the IAT are a matter of
some debate,25 but the cognitive mechanisms underlying the research
are clear enough. The white preference arises from well-established
mnemonic links. Whites more closely associate white faces with posi-
tive words and black faces with negative words than the opposite.
Thus, when they complete the white/good versus black/bad trials,
they need only make a judgment about whether the stimulus that
appears in the middle of the screen is positive or negative. The incon-
gruent association, in contrast, requires that they first judge whether
the stimulus is a word or a face and then decide on which side it
belongs. Stereotype-incongruent associations interfere with the sort-
ing task in much the same way that the use of green ink can make the
word "blue" hard to read.26
The white preference on the IAT is well-documented among
white Americans.2 7 Researchers have conducted and published hun-
dreds of academic studies, and several million people have partici-
pated in IAT research.281 They have determined that the implicit
biases documented through IAT research are not the product of the
order in which people undertake the tasks, their handedness, or any
deviation, and a "moderate" effect means an effect that is in between one-quarter and
three-quarters of a standard deviation.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 110.
25 See Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or "Would
Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the Implicit Association Test?, "15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 257-58 (2004)
(arguing that the IAT does not measure bias or prejudice); Mahzarin R. Banaji et al.,
No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 279,
279 (2004) (responding to the arguments of Arkes and Tetlock).
26 See J. Ridley Stroop, Studies of Interference in Serial Verbal Reactions, 18J. EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOL. 643, 659-60 (1935) (presenting evidence that words colored differ-
ently from their semantic meaning are difficult to read).
27 See Project Implicit, supra note 13.
28 Id.
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other artifact of the experimental method.2 9 The prevailing wisdom is
that IAT scores reveal implicit or unconscious bias.30
B. Implicit Bias and Behavior
Even if implicit bias is as widespread as the IAT studies suggest, it
does not necessarily lead to, or explain, racially disparate treatment.
Only if researchers can show that implicit bias influences deci-
sionmakers can we infer that implicit bias is a cause of racial
disparities.
Implicit bias, at least as measured by the IAT, appears to correlate
with behavior in some settings. In a recent review, Greenwald and his
colleagues identified 122 research reports assessing the relationship
between IAT scores and observable behaviors;31 of these, thirty-two
involved "White-Black interracial behavior. ''32 Across these twenty-
four studies, the researchers found a modest correlation of 0.24
between the implicit bias measures and the observed behaviors tested
in the studies."" This means that implicit bias accounted for roughly
six percent of the variation in actual behavior. 34
Six percent might not sound like much, but a six percent dispar-
ity could have an enormous impact on outcomes in the criminal jus-
tice system. In a typical year, judges preside over approximately
twenty-one million criminal cases in state courts3 5 and seventy thou-
29 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test: I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 209-11
(2003) (discussing mechanisms for reducing order effects); see also Anthony G.
Greenwald & Brian A. Nosek, Health of the Implicit Association Test at Age 3, 48 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR EXPERIMENTELLE PSYCHOLOGIE 85, 87 (2001) ("Subject handedness was
found to have essentially zero relation to magnitude of the race IAT effect.").
30 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 477 (2007); Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at
199-200.
31 Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcom-
ing 2009).
32 Note that some of the papers Greenwald and his co-authors include in their
analysis report multiple studies using independent samples of subjects. Id. (manu-
script at 10, 21).
33 Id. (manuscript at 21).
34 To be precise, the square of the correlation coefficient of 0.24 is 0.0576, which
we round up to 6%.
35 See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
2006, at 45-46 (Robert C. LaFountain et al. eds., 2006), http://www.ncsconline.org/
D_Research/csp/2006_files/EWSC-2007WholeDocument.pdf (providing data for
criminal cases entering state courts in 2005).
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sand in federal courts, 36 many of which involve black defendants.
Throughout the processing of these cases, judges make many judg-
ments concerning bail, pretrial motions, evidentiary issues, witness
credibility, and so forth. Each of these judgments could be influenced
by implicit biases, so the cumulative effect on bottom-line statistics like
incarceration rates and sentence length is much larger than one
might imagine.3 7 Furthermore, six percent is only an average. Some
judges likely hold extremely strong implicit biases. And some defend-
ants are apt to trigger an unconscious bias to a much greater extent
than others. 38 Even this seemingly small effect might harm tens or
even hundreds of thousands of black defendants every year.
Researchers have found, however, that people may have the abil-
ity to compensate for the effects of implicit bias.3 9 If they are inter-
nally driven or otherwise motivated to suppress their own biases,
people can make judgments free from biases, 40 even implicit ones.41
In one recent study,4 2 for example, a team of researchers adminis-
tered the IAT to a group of physicians and asked them to diagnose
and treat a hypothetical patient-identified to some of the physicians
as a white man and to others as a black man-based on a description
36 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS:
MARCH 31, 2007, at 58 tbl.D (2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2007/tables/
D00CMar07.pdf (observing U.S. district courts to have 71,652 and 69,697 cases pend-
ing in the twelve-month periods ending March 31, 2006 and 2007, respectively).
37 Kang & Banaji, supra note 7, at 1073.
38 SeeJennifer Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. ScI. 383, 384 (2006)
("Defendants whose appearance was perceived as more stereotypically Black were
more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants whose appearance was per-
ceived as less stereotypically Black.").
39 See Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 164-65, 170-71 (2008).
40 See Bridget C. Dunton & Russell H. Fazio, An Individual Difference Measure of
Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 316,
324-26 (1997); E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation to
Respond Without Prejudice, 75J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 811, 824-28 (1998).
41 See John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of
Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361,
375-78 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Patricia G. Devine et al., The
Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without
Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845-47 (2002);John F. Dovidio et
al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 510, 535-36 (1997); Russell H. Fazio et al., Variability in Automatic Activation
as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1013, 1025-26 (1995).
42 Green et al., supra note 10.
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of symptoms. 4 3 The researchers found a correlation between IAT
scores and treatment; the physicians with higher IAT scores were
more likely to offer appropriate treatment to white patients than to
black patients diagnosed with the same condition.4 4 But among the
sixty-seven physicians who reported some awareness of the purpose of
the study, those with higher 1AT scores were more likely to recom-
mend the treatment to black patients. 45 In other words, the doctors
who were aware of the purpose of the study compensated for their
implicit biases when the situation made them sensitive to the risk of
behaving-or being observed to behave-in a biased way. "This sug-
gests," argue the authors, "that implicit bias can be recognized and
modulated to counteract its effect on treatment decisions."46
Jack Glaser and Eric Knowles found similar results in a study
using the so-called "Shooter Task. '47 In research of this type, subjects
participate in a simulation akin to a video game in which they watch a
person on screen pull either a gun or an innocent object, like a wallet,
out of his pocket.48 If he pulls a gun, the participants are instructed
43 Id. at 1232-33.
44 Id. at 1235. The researchers also found that white doctors who express white
preferences on the IAT were more likely to diagnose black patients than white patients
as having coronary artery disease, based upon the same symptoms. Id. at 1234-35.
Indeed, the doctors offered the appropriate treatment-thrombolysis-to an equal
number of black patients as white patients! Id. As the authors rightly point out, this
does not mean there was no disparity; among patients who were diagnosed as suffer-
ing from coronary artery disease, black patients were less likely to be offered the
appropriate treatment. Id. It is at least curious, however, that doctors with implicit
white preferences would be more likely to diagnose coronary artery disease for black
patients than white patients, but less likely to treat it. The diagnosis disparity runs in
the opposite direction of the treatment-for-diagnosis disparity, and ultimately, the two
effects actually cancel each other out. Id. at 1236-37. Of course, if doctors behaved
the same way in the real world, black and white patients who presented the same symptoms
would be treated in the same way. Thus, though the IAT predicted discriminatory acts,
implicit bias does not seem to result in discrimination overall. Id. at 1234-37. This
aspect of the study has been the source of some debate. See John Tierney, In Bias Test,
Shades of Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at D1. One other recent study also shows no
correlation between measures of implicit bias and medical decisions among physi-
cians. SeeJanice A. Sabin et al., Physician Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes About Race and
Quality of Medical Care, 46 MED. CARE 678, 682 (2008) ("We did not find a relationship
between difference in treatment recommendations by patient race and implicit
measures.").
45 Green et al., supra note 10, at 1235.
46 Id. at 1237.
47 Glaser & Knowles, supra note 39, at 167-71.
48 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315-17
(2002).
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to "shoot" by pushing a button on a joystick; if he pulls a benign
object, they are instructed to refrain from shooting.49 Researchers
have found that most white adults exhibit a "shooter bias" in that they
are more likely to shoot a black target-regardless of what object the
on-screen target pulls out of his pocket 50-and that this effect corre-
lates with a white preference on the AT.5 1 Glaser and Knowles found
in their study, however, that those rare individuals with a white prefer-
ence on the IAT and who are highly motivated to control prejudice
were able to avoid the shooter bias.5 2 In short, "those high in an
implicit negative attitude toward prejudice show less influence of
implicit stereotypes on automatic discrimination." 53
In sum, the research on implicit bias suggests that people exhibit
implicit biases, that there is some evidence that implicit bias can influ-
ence behavior, and that people can overcome or compensate for
implicit biases if properly motivated and if the racial context is made
sufficiently salient. Whether and how this research applies to judges
and the criminal justice system is an open question and one to which
we turn in the next Part.
II. THE STUDY DESIGN
We are aware of only two IAT studies exploring a behavior of
direct interest to the criminal justice system. In one study, researchers
found that college student subjects harboring a strong implicit bias in
favor of whites imposed longer criminal sentences on a Latino defend-
ants than on a white defendants. 5 4 In another study in Germany,
researchers correlated implicit attitudes towards native Germans and
Turkish immigrants among German college students with judgments
of guilt of a Turkish defendant.55 The researchers found a high corre-
lation between negative association with Turkish immigrants and judg-
ments of guilt when the materials made "threatening" aspects of the
49 Id. at 1315-16.
50 Id. at 1320.
51 Id. at 1320-21; Glaser & Knowles, supra note 39, at 168-69.
52 Glaser & Knowles, supra note 39, at 169-70.
53 Id. at 171.
54 Robert W. Livingston, When Motivation Isn't Enough: Evidence of Uninten-
tional Deliberative Discrimination Under Conditions of Response Ambiguity 9-10
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
55 See Arnd Florack et al., Der Einfluss Wahrgenommener Bedrohung auf die Nutzung
Automatischer Assoziationen bei der Personenbeurteilung [ The Impact of Perceived Threat on the
Use of Automatic Associations in Person Judgments], 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALPSYCHO-
LOGIE 249 (2001).
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Turkish defendant salient.56 Though suggestive, these studies, stand-
ing alone, do not tell us much about implicit bias in the criminal jus-
tice system. Most importantly, they tell us nothing about a central
actor in the system: the judge. Do judges hold implicit racial biases?
If so, do those biases affect their judgments in court? We sought to
answer these two questions in our study.57
A. Judges
We recruited judges to participate in our study at judicial educa-
tion conferences, as we have in our prior work.58 The 133 judges who
participated in our study came from three different jurisdictions. 59
The judges asked us not to identify their jurisdictions, 60 but we can
describe the basic characteristics of each of the three. We recruited
seventy judges from a large urban center in the eastern United
56 Id. at 255 tbl.1.
57 We recognize that we have emphasized disparities concerning black Ameri-
cans, rather than other races. We have done so for three reasons. First, even though
Latinos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans are also targets of racism, both
explicit and implicit, in the United States some of the most striking disparities involve
black Americans in the legal system. Second, the research on the IAT has emphasized
biases concerning black Americans as well. Third, our sample of judges includes a
large group of black American judges, but few Latinos, few Asian Americans, and no
Native Americans. We thus cannot draw any conclusions about the reactions of
judges of these ethnicities. We therefore focus our attention here on biases involving
black Americans.
58 See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1, 13 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., How Judges Decide] ; Chris Guthrie
et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 814-15 (2001) [hereinafter
Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's
Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1256-59 (2006); AndrewJ. Wistrich et al., Can Judges
Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 1251, 1323-24 (2005).
59 At two of the conferences, we collected data from judges attending a plenary
session. At the third, we collected data from judges attending an optional session.
60 Their concerns might be justified. Some of our previous work has been
reported in the New York Times and the American Bar Association Journal, among other
places. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Judicial Reasoning Is All Too Human, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2001, at B7; Debra Cassens Weiss, Judges Flunk Story Problem Test, Showing Intuitive
Decision-Making, A.B.A.J., Feb. 19, 2008, https://abajournal.com/news/judges~flunk-
story-problem-test_showing-intuitive-decision-making/. The latter report leads
with the unfortunate headline 'Judges Flunk Story Problem Test," which casts the
judges in a more negative light than the data warrant. Interest in the present Article
is sufficiently high that, despite our own efforts to limit its use before it was finalized,
it was cited by Judge Jack Weinstein in a published opinion, United States v. Taveras,
424 F. Supp. 2d 446, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), and discussed at length in a recent volume
of the Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Lane et al., supra note 6, at 441-45.
20091 120 5
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
States. 61 These seventy judges, who are appointed to the bench for
renewable terms, constitute roughly three-quarters of the judges who
sit in this jurisdiction. We recruited forty-five judges from a large
urban center in the western United States.62 These forty-five judges,
who are appointed to the bench but then stand for election, make up
roughly half of the judges in their jurisdiction. We recruited our final
group of judges at an optional session at a regional conference.
These eighteen judges, who sit in various towns and cities throughout
the state in which the conference was held, are appointed to the
bench but are then required to stand for election. 63
We did not ask the judges to identify themselves by name, but we
did ask them to identify their race, gender, exact title, political affilia-
tion, and years of experience on the bench. 64 Table 1 summarizes the
demographic information that the judges provided. As Table 1 indi-
cates, our sample of judges, particularly those from the eastern juris-
diction, is fairly diverse, at least in terms of gender and race.
61 Eightyjudges attended the session at which we collected data, but we excluded
ten from our study. We excluded one judge at his or her request. We excluded nine
other judges because they failed to provide us with demographic information. We
believe that these failures were largely accidental. To complete the demographic
page, the judges had to return to the written materials after completing the final IAT,
and these nine judges failed to do so. We did not realize that this process would cause
problems at our presentation in the eastern jurisdiction, and hence we did not obtain
this data. In the subsequent presentations, we made sure that the judges completed
the last page as we collected the surveys.
62 Forty-eight judges attended the session at which we collected the data, but we
excluded three from our study. One judge neglected to provide demographic infor-
mation, and we lost the data for two other judges due to a computer malfunction.
63 Over ninety percent of the judges in the eastern jurisdiction attended this con-
ference (although, as noted, we did not obtain data from all of them). Attendance
was lower among the western judges; the sample includes roughly half of thejudges in
their jurisdiction. These judges' willingness to participate in our study was thus
unlikely to have been affected by their interest (or lack thereof) in the content of the
material. In fact, the judges were not aware of the subject matter of the talk before
the session began. This was not our first presentation to the eastern judges. Three
years earlier, we had presented a completely different set of materials to the same
educational conference. Some of the results from that earlier session have been pub-
lished, also without identifying the jurisdiction. Wistrich et al., supra note 58, at
1279-81. Many of the judges were therefore familiar with our methods, although the
present study differs from our earlier work. Our prior work dealt largely with judicial
reliance on heuristics in making judgments, whereas this research is entirely devoted
to the influence of race and gender on judgment. This was our first presentation to
the westernjudges. The regional judges differed from the eastern and western judges
in that they opted not only to attend the judicial education conference at which we
spoke but also to attend our optional session.
64 We include these questions below in Appendix A.
12o6 (VOL. 84:3
UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL BIAS
TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF THE JUDGES
(PERCENTAGE WITHIN GROUP AND NUMBER)
Demographic Eastern Western Optional
Parameter urisdiction (70) Iurisdiction (45) Conference (18) Overall (133)
White 52.9 (37) 80.0 (36) 66.7 (12) 63.9 (85)
Black 42.9 (30) 4.4 (2) 5.6 (1) 24.8 (33)Race
Latino 4.3 (3) 11.1 (5) 16.7 (3) 8.3 (11)
Asian 0.0 (0) 4.4 (2) 11.1 (2) 3.0 (4)
Gender Male 55.7 (39) 66.7 (30) 50.0 (9) 58.7 (78)
Female 44.3 (31) 33.3 (15) 50.0 (9) 41.4 (55)
itical Democrat 86.6 (58) 64.4 (29) 64.7 (11) 76.0 (98)
iliation Republican 13.4 (9) 35.6 (16) 35.3 (7) 24.0 (31)
Average Years of 9.8 10.8 9.3 10.1
Experience
B. Methods and Materials
To explore the two questions animating this Article-that is,
whether judges hold implicit racial biases, and if so, whether those
biases produce biased judicial decisions-we designed a multipart
study requiring the participating judges to complete computer tasks65
and then to respond to a paper questionnaire.
We proceeded as follows. We placed in front of each judge a
laptop computer and a questionnaire. The computer screen and the
front page of the questionnaire introduced the study and asked the
judges to await instruction before beginning.66 Once the judges were
65 The computer tasks were all conducted on laptop computers rented for the
purpose of running the experiment. They were all relatively contemporary machines
of similar makes. At the eastern and western sessions, all were Hewlett-Packard
NX9010; at the regional conference, they were IBM ThinkPads. All had fifteen-inch
screens. The software to run the tasks was designed with a program called Inquisit
2.0, created specifically for measuring implicit associations by a company called Milli-
second Software. See Inquisit, http://www.millisecond.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
66 The instructions on the survey were as follows:
Many of the points to be discussed at this session are best experienced
directly. We therefore ask that before the session starts, you participate in a
series of exercises on the laptop computer and evaluate a series of hypotheti-
cal cases in the pages that follow. (Participation in all aspects of this exercise
is voluntary, of course.) Please do not discuss these materials while you are
participating. We shall collect these surveys before the discussion and pre-
sent the results during the session.
The first part of the exercise consists of a computer task. Please do not
begin the task or turn this page until asked to do so.
The instructions on the computer screen were:
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fully assembled, we announced "Today, we shall ask you to participate
actively in your own education."67
We asked the judges to complete the computer tasks and to
respond to the questionnaire according to the instructions provided.
We assured the judges that their responses were anonymous and that
we had no way of identifying them individually, but we also made clear
that participation was entirely voluntary and that any judge who
wanted to exclude her results from the study could do so. (Only one
judge chose to do so.) We informed the judges that we would com-
pile their cumulative results and share them with the group at the end
of the session.
With these important preliminaries out of the way, we then asked
the judges to begin the study. The study included a race IAT;68 two
hypothetical vignettes in which the race of the defendant was not
explicitly identified but was subliminally primed; and another hypo-
thetical vignette in which the race of the defendant was made
explicit.6 9 The final page of the questionnaire asked judges to provide
the basic demographic information identified above.70
III, THE STUDY RESULTS
We present the results in two parts. First, we report the judges'
IAT scores, which demonstrate that judges, like the rest of us, harbor
implicit racial biases. Second, we report the results of our judicial
decisionmaking studies, which show that implicit biases can influence
judicial decisionmaking but can also be overcome, at least in our
experimental setting.71
JURISDICTION: Judicial Education Conference, DATE
We shall begin by making announcements as to the nature of this exercise.
Please DO NOT BEGIN until after the announcements.
After the announcements, please press the space bar to begin.
67 Judge Wistrich conducted the introduction at the eastern and western confer-
ences; Professor Rachlinski did it at the regional conference.
68 We also conducted an IAT related to gender after the race IAT, but do not
report those results here.
69 We also included a scenario in which we manipulated the gender of a target
legal actor as the third scenario. We do not report these results here.
70 The order of the materials was thus as follows: the priming task; the written
scenario of the shoplifter; the written scenario of the armed robber; the gender scena-
rio (not reported here); the battery case; the race IAT; the gender IAT (not reported
here); and the demographics page.
71 We analyzed the three groups of judges separately, but there were no signifi-
cant differences between the judges, except as noted below, so we have kept them
together throughout the analysis. Similarly, we found no differences between the
judges on the basis of the gender, political affiliation, or experience. Because previ-
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A. The Implicit Association Test
To measure implicit associations involving race, we gave the
judges a computer-based-race IAT comparable to the race TAT given
to millions of study participants around the world.72 We asked the
judges to perform two trials of the IAT, as described above. The first
required them to pair white faces with positive words and black faces
with negative words. In other words, the first trial required them to
select stereotype-congruent pairings. The second required them to
pair white faces with negative words and black faces with positive
words. In other words, the second trial required them to select stereo-
type-incongruent pairings.73
To determine each judge's implicit bias score, we performed two
calculations. First, we subtracted each judge's average response
latency in the stereotype-congruent round from the stereotype-incon-
gruent round to calculate the TAT measure. This measure reflects the
most commonly used scoring method for large samples of data col-
lected on the Internet, and hence allows us to compare judges to ordi-
nary adults.74 Second, we constructed a standardized measure
consisting of the average difference in response latencies for each
judge divided by the standard deviation of thatjudge's response laten-
cies in the target rounds. This measure is less commonly reported,
but more stable, and produces higher correlations with other
behaviors. 7
ous research on the IAT suggests that Latinos score somewhat closer to black Ameri-
cans on the IAT we used, we combined the few Latinojudges with the blackjudges for
these analyses, Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 110 tbl,2. Similarly, we combined the
Asian American judges with the white judges.
72 The exact instructions at the outset of the TAT were as follows:
The remaining computer tasks involve making CATEGORY JUDGMENTS.
Once the tasks begin, a word or words describing the CATEGORIES will
appear in the upper left and upper right corners of the computer screen,
A TARGET word or picture will also be displayed in the center of the screen,
which you must assign to one of the two categories
Please respond AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, but don't respond so fast that
you make many errors. (Occasional errors are okay.)
An "X" will appear when you make an error. Whenever the "X" appears,
correct the mistake by pressing the other key.
73 For a more detailed account of our TAT procedure, see Appendix B.
74 See, e.g., Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 104-05 (reporting average differences
in response latencies among large samples of subjects obtained through the
Internet).
75 See Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 209-10 (describing standardized mea-
sures). The full account of our scoring methods is included as Appendix C.
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We found a strong white preference among the white judges, as
shown in Table 2. Among the eighty-five white judges, seventy-four
(or 87.1%) showed a white preference on the IAT. Overall, the white
judges performed the stereotype-congruent trial (white/good and
black/bad) 216 milliseconds faster than the stereotype-incongruent
trial (black/good and white/bad). The black judges, by contrast,
demonstrated no clear preference overall. Although fourteen of
forty-three (or 44.2%) showed a white preference, the black judges
performed the stereotype-congruent trial (white/good and black/
bad) a mere twenty-six milliseconds faster than the stereotype-incon-
gruent trial (black/good and white/bad). Comparing the mean IAT
scores of the white judges with those of the black judges revealed that
the white judges expressed a significantly larger white preference. 76
TABLE 2: RESULTS OF RACE IAT BY RACE OF JUDGE
Race of Judge Mean IAT Score in milliseconds Percent of Judges with lower
(sample size) (and standard deviation)* average latencies on the(saplesiz)_(ndtanarddevatin) white/good versus black/bad round
Judges Internet Sample
White (85) 216 (201) 158 (224) 87.1 1
Black (43) 26 (208) 39 (244) 44.2 J
*Note: Positive numbers indicate lower latencies on the white/good versus black/bad
round
Because we used a commonly administered version of the IAT, we
are able to compare the results of our study to the results of other
studies involving ordinary adults. We found that the black judges pro-
duced LAT scores comparable to those observed in the sample of black
subjects obtained on the Internet.77 The white judges, on the other
76 The specific statistical result was: t(82) = 4.94, p < .0001. Throughout this Arti-
cle, we reserve the use of the words "significant" and "significantly" for statistical
significance.
77 The specific statistical result was: t(42) = 0.18, p = .86. In conducting this test,
we took the effect size among the Internet sample of 0.16 standard deviations to be
the "population" effect size among black participants on the Internet, and tested
whether our observed difference, with our observed standard deviation, would be
likely to be reliably higher or lower than the effect in the Internet data. The priming
condition did not appear to affect the judges' IAT scores. Also, the judges themselves
varied somewhat in their IAT scores. White judges in the eastern jurisdiction
expressed an average standardized preference of 0.33, compared to 0.48 and 0.55 in
the western jurisdiction and the regional conferences, respectively. These differences
were marginally significant. Because the black judges in our study were concentrated
largely in the eastern jurisdiction, similar tests for variations among these judges
would not be reliable.
[VOL. 84:31210
UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL BIAS
hand, demonstrated a statistically significantly stronger white prefer-
ence than that observed among a sample of white subjects obtained
on the Internet. 78 For two reasons, however, this does not necessarily
mean that the white judges harbor more intense white preferences
than the general pcpulation. First, we did not vary the order in which
we presented the materials, and this order effect could have led to
artificially higher IAT scores. 79 Second, the judges performed both
trials much more slowly than the other adults with whom we are mak-
ing this comparison, and this, too, could have led to artificially higher
IAT scores.80 We also suspect that the judges were older, on average,
than the Internet sample. To the extent that implicit racial bias is less
pronounced among younger people, we would expect the judges to
exhibit more implicit bias than the Internet sample.
B. IAT and Judicial Behavior
To assess the impact of implicit bias on judicial decisionmaking,
we gave the judges three hypothetical cases: the first involving a juve-
nile shoplifter, the second involving a juvenile robber, and the third
involving a battery. We speculated that the judges might respond dif-
ferently depending upon whether we made the race of the defendant
salient, so in the first two cases, we did not identify the race of the
defendant explicitly, but we did so implicitly through a subliminal
priming technique described below. In the third case, we made race
explicit, informing some of the judges that the defendant was "Cauca-
sian" and others that he was "African American." 81 By comparing the
78 The specific statistical result was: t(84) = 2.26, p = .026. We compared our
results to those of the Internet sample reported in Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 105.
In making this comparison, we took the effect size among the Internet sample of 0.83
standard deviations to be the "population" effect size among white participants on the
Internet, and tested whether our observed difference, with our observed standard
deviation, would likely be reliably higher or lower than the effect in the Internet data.
79 We selected data collection and scoring procedures so as to minimize the
effects of order of presentation. Greenwald and his fellow authors reported that the
effect of order of presentation is less than one percent, using the methods we fol-
lowed. See Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 210 tbl.2.
80 See id. at 200 ("IAT effects will be artificially larger for any subjects who
respond slowly.").
81 Throughout this Article we follow the convention of using the terms "black"
and "white" to denote race, as the terms more closely reflect the faces in the IAT, the
instructions in the IAT (which refer to black and white), and might more closely
reflect how the black judges would describe themselves (although there would be
variation on this). When referring to the criminal defendants, however, we use Afri-
can American and Caucasian, following the references mentioned in the hypothetical
cases.
2009] 1211
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
judges' individual JAT scores with their judgments in these hypotheti-
cal cases, we are able to assess whether implicit bias correlates with
racially disparate outcomes in court.
1. Race Primed
We asked the judges to decide two hypothetical cases, one involv-
ing a juvenile shoplifter and one involving a juvenile armed robber.
Before giving the judges the scenarios, though, we asked them to per-
form a subliminal priming task, following a protocol developed by
Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery.8 2 The task appeared to be a sim-
ple, computer-based, spatial recognition task.83 To complete the task,
the judges were required to focus their attention on the center of the
computer screen in front of them. Words appeared in one of the four
corners for 153 milliseconds before being masked by a string of ran-
dom letters.8 4 At that speed, words are extremely difficult to process
82 Graham & Lowery, supra note 9, at 487-88.
83 At the beginning of the task, three asterisks appeared in the center of the
screen. A sixteen-character letter string then appeared in one of the four quadrants
of the screen. The judges were instructed to press a specific key on the left-hand side
of the computer (the "E" key, which was marked with a red dot) when the letter string
appeared in one of the quadrants on the left and to press a specific key on the right-
hand side of the computer (the "I" key, which was also marked with a red dot) when a
word appeared in one of the two quadrants on the right. Reminders as to which key
to press also remained on the computer screen throughout the first task (that is,
"press the 'E' key for left" and "press the 'I' key for right"). When the judges identi-
fied the quadrant correctly, the word "correct" would appear in the center in letters.
When the judges made an error, the word "error" would appear instead. In either
case, the three asterisks would then replace the words "correct" or "error" and the
task would repeat. The exact instructions the judges saw are below.
Once you begin the first computer task, the screen will go blank, then three
asterisks (* * *) will appear in the center. Focus your attention on these. A
string of letters will then appear in the upper-right, lower-right, upper-left,
or lower-left portion of the computer screen.
If the string appears on the left-hand side (either up or down), press the "E"
key.
If the string appears on the right-hand side (either up or down), press the
"I" key.
If you correctly identify the position, the screen will flash the word "correct";
if you identify the wrong position, the screen will flash the word "error."
The task will then repeat a number of times. Other words may appear with
the letter string. Ignore these and try to identify the position of the letters as
quickly as possible.
When you are ready, press the space bar to begin the task.
84 Each trial thus proceeded as follows: the three asterisks would appear in the
center of the screen; 1200 milliseconds later (1.2 seconds) one of the prime words
(selected at random) would appear in one of the four quadrants (at random as deter-
[VOL. 84:31212
UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL BIAS
consciously.8 5 Each judge saw sixty words. Half of the judges saw
words associated with black Americans,8 6 and half saw words with no
common theme.8 7 After the sixtieth trial, the task stopped.8 8 The
computer screen then instructed the judges to turn to the written
materials.8 9
mined by the computer); 153 milliseconds after that, the letter-string would appear
over the prime; this would remain until the judge pressed either the "E" or "I" key;
then either the "correct" or "error" in the center (depending upon the judge's
response) and would remain for roughly one second; then the three asterisks would
replace the word "correct" or "error"; and the process would repeat. Due to an error
in the computer programming, the judges in the eastern conference were only
exposed to the subliminal prime for sixty-four milliseconds, rather than 153
milliseconds.
85 Graham and Lowery reported that none of the officers in their study was able
to identify the nature of the words being shown to them. Graham & Lowery, supra
note 9, at 491. We did not ask our judges their assessment of what the words were.
86 The words came directly from the Graham and Lowery study: graffiti, Harlem,
homeboy, jerricurl, minority, mulatto, negro, rap, segregation, basketball, black,
Cosby, gospel, hood, Jamaica, roots, afro, Oprah, Islam, Haiti, pimp, dreadlocks, plan-
tation, slum, Tyson, welfare, athlete, ghetto, calypso, reggae, rhythm, soul. Id. at 489
n.5.
87 These words also came directly from Graham and Lowery: baby, enjoyment,
heaven, kindness, summer, sunset, truth, playful, accident, coffin, devil, funeral, hor-
ror, mosquito, stress, toothache, warmth, trust, sunrise, rainbow, pleasure, paradise,
laughter, birthday, virus, paralysis, loneliness, jealousy, hell, execution, death, agony.
Graham and Lowery used neutral words that matched the words associated with black
Americans for positive or negative associations. Id.
88 Our study differed from that of Graham and Lowery in several ways, any of
which might have affected the results. First, Graham and Lowery used eighty trials,
rather than the sixty we used. Id. at 489-90. Second, because we ran a large group of
judges at the same time, we did not use audible beeps to indicate correct responses.
Id. Third, our hypothetical defendants differed. We did not have access to the origi-
nal materials Graham and Lowery used, and so wrote our own. See fact pattern infra
Appendix A. Fourth, we asked fewer questions concerning the hypothetical defend-
ants. Although we do not see how any of these differences would necessarily affect
the results, priming tasks can be sensitive to details.
89 The following appeared on the screen:
Thank you for completing the first computer task.
Now please turn to the written materials.
Please leave this computer on with the screen up.
After you have completed four pages of written materials, please press the
space bar to continue with the final computer tasks.
In case a judge accidentally or mistakenly hit the space bar, we added another inter-
vening page before the second computer task, which appeared once the space bar was
pressed. It read as follows:
If you have completed the four case summaries, please press the space bar to
begin the final computer task.
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a. The Shoplifter Case
We first presented the judges with a scenario called the "Shop-
lifter Case." The judges learned that William, a thirteen year old with
no prior criminal record, had been arrested for shoplifting several
toys from a large, upscale toy store. 90 The judges read that there is
some conflicting evidence on the degree to which William resisted
arrest, but there is no dispute over the fact that he had shoplifted.9'
Following the scenario, we asked the judges three questions
about William. First, we asked them what disposition they thought
most appropriate. We listed seven options below the question, rang-
ing from a dismissal of the case to a transfer to adult court.92 Second,
we asked judges to predict on a seven-point scale (from "Not at all
Likely" to "Very Likely") whether William would commit a similar
crime in the future. And finally, we asked them to predict on an iden-
tical seven-point scale the likelihood that William would commit a
more serious crime in the future. In short, we asked them one ques-
tion about sentencing and two questions about recidivism.
The judges' determinations were not influenced by race. As
shown in Table 3, judges primed with the black-associated words did
not produce significantly different judgments than the judges primed
with the neutral words.93 Our primary interest, however, was in deter-
mining whether the judges' implicit biases correlated with their judg-
ments. We found that the judges' scores on the race IAT had a
marginally significant influence on how the prime influenced their
judgment.94 Judges who exhibited a white preference on the IAT gave
90 The location of the crime would reveal the jurisdiction and hence we delete it.
The location was an upscale shopping district.
91 The exact materials for this scenario and all others are included infra Appen-
dix A.
92 The options were as follows:
(1) Dismiss it with an oral warning
(2) Adjourn the case in contemplation of dismissal (assuming William gets
in no further trouble)
(3) Put William on probation for six months or less
(4) Put William on probation for more than six months
(5) Commit William to a juvenile detention facility for six months or less
(6) Commit William to ajuvenile detention facility for more than six months
(7) Transfer William to adult court.
93 The results were as follows: Question 1, z = 0.51, p = .61; Question 2, z = 0.73,
p = .46; Question 3, z =1.09, p = .28.
94 To accomplish this analysis, we conducted an ordered logit regression of the
judges' disposition against the priming condition, the judges' IAT scores, and an
interaction of the two. The interaction term reflects the effect of the IAT score on
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TABLE 3: AVERAGE RESULTS ON JUVENILE SHOPLIFTER (ALL THREE
QUESTIONS ON A SEVEN-POINT SCALE: HIGHER NUMBERS INDICATE
HARSHER JUDGMENTS*)
Prime (and n) Q: Disposit Recidivism-Same Q3: Recidivism-MoreICyime Serious Crime
Black (63) 2.34 2.58 2.23
Neutral (70) 2.40 2.36 1.94
*Note: The seven-point scale for questions two and three have been transposed from
the original for this Table, so that higher numbers consistently meant harsher
judgment.
harsher sentences to defendants if they had been primed with black-
associated words rather than neutral words, while judges who exhib-
ited a black preference on the IAT gave less harsh sentences to
defendants if they had been primed with black-associated words
rather than neutral words. We did not find any significant relation-
ship between the judges' IAT scores and either of the recidivism mea-
sures, although the data showed a similar trend.9 5
b. The Robbery Case
The second scenario, called the "Robbery Case," described
Michael, who was arrested for armed robbery at a gas station
convenience store two days shy of his seventeenth birthday.9 6
Michael, who had previously been arrested for a fight in the school
lunchroom, threatened the clerk at the convenience store with a gun
and made off with $267 in cash. He admitted the crime, claiming that
his friends had dared him to do it. After they had read this scenario,
we asked the judges the same three questions we asked them about
William in the shoplifter case.
Again the judges' determinations were not influenced by race. As
shown in Table 4, the judges primed with black-associated words did
not produce significantly different ratings than the judges primed
how the prime affected the judge. This term was marginally significant in the model,
z = 1.84, p = .07.
95 For the first recidivism question, z = 1.41, p = .16. On the second recidivism
question, z = 1.49, p = .14. On these questions, the black judges and the white judges
seemed to respond in similar ways. We ran the full model (predictors of prime, race
ofjudge, IAT, and all interactions between these variables) on all three variables as
well. Adding the race-ofjudge terms and interactions did not produce any significant
effects.
96 The use of an armed robbery breaks somewhat with Graham and Lowery, who
had used two simple property crimes. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 9, at 490.
2009 ] 1215
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
TABLE 4: AVERAGE RESULTS ON JUVENILE ARMED ROBBER (ALL THREE
QUESTIONS ON A SEVEN-POINT SCALE: HIGHER NUMBERS INDICATE
HARSHER JUDGMENTS*)
Pime (and n) Q: Disposition Q2: Recidivism-Same Q3: Recidivism-PIm (me Seious Cri
Black (63) 4.92 3.54 3.17
Neutral (70) 4.97 3.61 3.48
*Note: The seven-point scale for questions two and three have been transposed from
the original for this Table, so that higher numbers consistently meant harsher
judgment.
with the neutral words.97 As noted, however, our primary interest was
in the relationship between implicit bias and these judgments. As
with the shoplifting case, the judges' scores on the race IAT had a
marginally significant influence on how the prime influenced their
judgment in the robbery case. 9 Judges who exhibited a white prefer-
ence on the IAT gave harsher sentences to defendants if they had
been primed with black-associated words rather than neutral words,
while judges who exhibited a black preference on the IAT gave less
harsh sentences to defendants if they had been primed with black-
associated words rather than neutral words. We did not find any sig-
nificant relationship between the judges' IAT scores and either of the
recidivism measures, although the data showed a similar trend.99
To summarize, we found no overall difference between those
judges primed with black-associated words and those primed with
race-neutral words. This finding contrasts sharply with research con-
ducted by Graham and Lowery, who found that police and parole
officers primed with black-associated words were more likely than
those primed with neutral words to make harsh judgments of juvenile
offenders.100 The officers who had seen the black-associated words
97 The results were as follows: Question 1, z = 0.17, p = .87; Question 2, z = 0.09,
p = .93; and Question 3, z = 1.62, p = .11.
98 Our findings were: z = 1.85, p = .06.
99 For the first recidivism question, z = 0.62, p = .53; on the second recidivism
question, z = 0.54, p = .59. As above, on these questions, the black judges and the
white judges seemed to respond in similar ways. We ran the full model (predictors of
prime, race of judge, IAT, and all interactions between these variables) on all three
variables as well. Adding the race-of-judge terms and interactions did not produce
any significant effects.
100 See Graham & Lowery, supra note 9, at 493-94, 496.
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deemed the juveniles more culpable, more likely to recidivate, and
more deserving of a harsh punishment.101
The overall lack of an effect of the racial prime, however, gives us
little reason to conclude that the judges were not affected by their
unconscious racial biases. We found in both the shoplifter case and
the robbery case that judges who expressed a white preference on the
IAT were somewhat more likely to impose harsher penalties when
primed with black-associated words than when primed with neutral
words, while judges who expressed a black preference on the IAT
reacted in an opposite fashion to the priming conditions.
To be sure, we did not find a significant relationship between IAT
scores and the judges' judgments of recidivism. That is, white prefer-
ences on the IAT did not lead judges primed with words associated
with black Americans to predict higher recidivism rates. The judges
made fairly race-neutral assessments of the two defendants' character.
This result suggests that the correlation we found between TAT score
and sentence might not be robust. But, of course, a judges' neutral
assessment of character would be a small comfort to a juvenile defen-
dant who received an excessive sentence due to his race.
2. Race Made Explicit
The fact that we did not explicitly provide any information about
the race of the defendant (although judges obviously might have
made assumptions about their race) is important because judges will
commonly be aware of the race of the defendant appearing in front of
them. To address this concern, we also gave ourjudges a hypothetical
vignette in which we made race explicit. To enable comparison with
another study, we used a vignette developed by Samuel Sommers and
Phoebe Ellsworth. 10 2
We asked the judges to imagine they were presiding over a bench
trial in which the prosecution charges Andr6 Barkley, a high school
basketball player, with battering his teammate, Matthew Clinton.
There is no question that Barkley injured Clinton, but Barkley claims,
somewhat incredibly, that he was only acting in self-defense. We
informed some of the judges that the defendant was an African Amer-
ican male and that the victim was a Caucasian male. We informed the
101 Id. Only police officers predicted that the defendant was more likely to recidi-
vate; parole officers did not show any differences on this question. Id.
102 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
201, 216-17 (2001). We thank the authors for graciously sending us the materials
and giving us permission to use them.
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rest of the judges that the defendant was Caucasian and that the vic-
tim was African American. Following the scenario, we asked all of the
judges to render a verdict and to rate their confidence in their judg-
ment on a nine-point scale (from "Very Confident" to "Not at all
Confident"). 103
We found that the white judges were equally willing to convict the
defendant whether he was identified as Caucasian or as African Ameri-
can. Among the white judges who read about an African American
defendant, seventy-three percent (thirty-three out of forty-five) said
they would convict, whereas eighty percent (thirty-five out of forty-
four) of the white judges who read about a Caucasian defendant said
that they would convict.10 4 This contrasts sharply with the results
obtained by Sommers and Ellsworth, who used only white partici-
pants. They found that ninety percent of the participants in their
study who read about an African American defendant said that they
would convict as compared to seventy percent of the participants who
read about a Caucasian defendant. 0 5 On the other hand, we found
that black judges were significantly more willing to convict the defen-
dant when he was identified as Caucasian rather than as African Amer-
ican. When the defendant was identified as Caucasian, ninety-two
percent (twenty-four out of twenty-six) of the black judges voted to
convict; when he was identified as African American, however, only
fifty percent (nine out of eighteen) voted to convict. The difference
between the white judges and the black judges is statistically signifi-
103 We used the same question to elicit verdicts and confidence ratings as the one
Sommers and Ellsworth used: "Based on the available evidence, if this were a bench
trial, would you convict the defendant?" Below this were the words "Yes" and "No."
Finally, we asked the judges, "How confident are you that your judgment is correct?"
Below this question, the materials presented a nine-point scale, with "1" labeled "Not
at all Confident" and "9" labeled "Very Confident." Id. at 217; see also infra Appendix
A (providing the materials used in our study).
104 This difference was not statistically significant. Fishers exact test, p = .62.
105 The difference between our results and those obtained by Sommers and Ells-
worth is significant: X2 (1) = 6.74, p < .01 (using the expected conviction rates of sev-
enty percent for Caucasian defendants and ninety percent for African American
defendants, as reported by Sommers & Ellsworth, Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note
102, at 217).
1218 [VOL. 84:3
UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL BIAS
cant. 10 6 Analysis of the judges' assessments of their confidence in
their verdicts produced similar results. 10 7
The focus of this study, however, is on the relationship between
implicit bias and judgment. As above, we wanted to assess the effect of
the interaction between the judges' IAT scores and the race of the
defendant on the judges' verdicts. Unlike our results in the first study,
however, we did not find even a marginally significant interaction
here. 10 8 Judges who exhibited strong white preferences on the IAT
did not judge the white and black defendants differently, and neither
did judges who expressed black preferences on the IAT. Analysis of
the confidence ratings produced the same result.10 9
Because the white judges and the black judges reacted differently
to the problem, we also conducted an analysis to account for these
differences. To do this, we assessed the interaction between the race
of the defendant and the IAT score, along with the race of the
106 The analysis consisted of a logistic regression of the verdict against the race of
the defendant, the race of the judge, and the interaction of these two parameters.
The interaction was significant, z = 2.12, p = .03, which was the result of the differen-
tial treatment of the two defendants by the black judges. The race of the defendant
was also significant, z = 2.81, p = .005, indicating that overall, the judges were less
likely to convict the African American defendant than the Caucasian defendant.
107 We combined the nine-point confidence measure with the binary outcome to
create an eighteen-point scale. In our coding, a "1" corresponded to ajudge who was
very confident that the defendant should be acquitted, whereas an "18" corresponded
to ajudge who was very confident that the defendant should be convicted. The aver-
age confidence that the judges expressed in the defendant's guilt were as follows:
white judges judging Caucasian defendants-13.64; white judges judging African
American defendants-12.2; black judges judging Caucasian defendants-16.08;
black judges judging African American defendants-9.89. Statistical analysis of these
results (by ANOVA) produced results consistent with the analysis of the verdicts
alone. That is, the judges were significantly more convinced of the Caucasian defen-
dant's guilt than of the African American's guilt (F(1, 129) = 15.04, p < .001). This
disparity was much more pronounced among black judges (F(1, 129) = 5.84, p <
.025).
108 To accomplish this analysis, we conducted a logistic regression of the judges'
verdict against the priming condition, the judges' IAT scores, and an interaction of
the two. The interaction term reflects the effect of the IAT score on how the race of
the defendant affected the judges' verdict. This term was not significant in the
model, z - 1.04, p = .30.
109 We also replicated this analysis with the eighteen-point confidence ratings. See
infra note 112. Specifically, we regressed the judges' confidence in the defendant's
guilt against the defendant's race, the judges' TAT score, and the interaction between
the race and IAT score. As with the verdict itself, this analysis showed that the race of
the defendant was significant, t-ratio = 3.49, p < .001, but the interaction between race
of defendant and IAT score was not, t-ratio = 1.51, p = .13.
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judge. 110 The three-way interaction between race of judge, race of
defendant, and IAT score was significant."' This result means that
the IAT scores of the black judges and the white judges had different
effects on the judges' reactions to the race of the defendant, as we
explain below in further analyses. Analysis of the confidence ratings
produced similar results."12
To allow us to interpret this interaction, we ran the less complex
analysis separately for black and whitejudges. That is, we assessed the
interaction between the JAT score and race of the defendant in two
separate analyses. With respect to the white judges, we found no sig-
nificant results; if anything, the white judges with a greater white pref-
erence expressed a greater propensity to convict the Caucasian
defendant rather than the African American defendant. 13 Among
black judges, however, those who expressed a stronger black prefer-
ence on the IAT were less likely to convict the African American
defendant relative to the Caucasian defendant. 14 An analysis of con-
fidence ratings produced similar results. 115
The findings among black judges can best be seen by dividing the
black judges into two groups: those who expressed a black preference
on the IAT and those who expressed a white preference on the IAT.
Among those black judges who expressed a black preference, one
hundred percent (fourteen out of fourteen) voted to convict the Cau-
casian defendant, while only forty percent (four out of ten) of these
110 In this analysis, the race of the defendant and the interaction between race of
judge and race of the defendant were significant, just as they were in the simpler
models. (Race of defendant, z = 1.99, p = .05; interaction between race of the judge
and race of the defendant, z = 2.35, p = .02. The interaction of the defendant's race
and IAT score was not significant, z = 1.00, p = .23.)
111 The result was as follows: z = 2.18, p = .03.
112 Regressing the eighteen-point confidence rating against the race of the judge,
the race of the defendant, the judges' IAT scores, and all interactions between these
variables revealed significant effects for race of the defendant, t-ratio = 2.95, p = .005;
a significant interaction of race of the defendant with race of the judge, t-ratio = 2.68,
p = .01; and the three-way interaction of race of judge, race of defendant, and IAT
score, t-ratio = 2.68, p = .02. The interaction of race of defendant and IAT scores was
still not significant in this model, t-ratio = 1.27, p = .20.
113 The results are as follows: z = 1.15, p = .25.
114 The results are as follows: z = 1.87, p = .06. Given the high conviction rate of
the black judges for the Caucasian defendant, this trend actually meant that they were
more likely to convict the African American defendants to the extent that they exhib-
ited greater white preferences on the IAT.
115 The white judges displayed a greater propensity to convict the Caucasian
defendant relative to the African American defendant as the IAT score increased, but
the trend did not approach significance, t-ratio = 1.00, p = .40. The black judges
showed the opposite trend, which was significant: t-ratio = 2.25, p = .03.
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judges voted to convict the African American defendant. Among
those black judges who expressed a white preference, eighty-three
percent (ten out of twelve) voted to convict the Caucasian defendant,
while sixty-three percent (five out of eight) voted to convict the Afri-
can American defendant. In effect, the black judges who expressed
white preferences made verdict choices similar to those of their white
colleagues, while black judges who expressed a black preference
treated the African American defendant more leniently.
In sum, then, IAT scores predicted nothing among the white
judges. Among the black judges, however, a black preference on the
IAT was associated with a willingness to acquit the black defendant.
C. Interpretation of Results
Our research supports three conclusions. First, judges, like the
rest of us, carry implicit biases concerning race. Second, these
implicit biases can affect judges' judgment, at least in contexts where
judges are unaware of a need to monitor their decisions for racial bias.
Third, and conversely, when judges are aware of a need to monitor
their own responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are
motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.
Our first conclusion was perhaps the most predictable, though it
is still troubling. Given the large number of Americans who have
taken the IAT, and given the frequency with which white Americans
display at least a moderate automatic preference for white over black,
it would have been surprising if white judges had failed to exhibit the
same automatic preference. Similarly, the black judges carry a more
diverse array of implicit biases, just like black adults generally: some
exhibit a white preference just like the white judges; others exhibit no
preference; and some exhibit a black preference. Overall, like adults,
most of the judges-white and black-showed a moderate-to-large
degree of implicit bias in one direction or the other. If ordinary
adults carry a "bigot in the brain," as one recent article put it,' 16 then
our data suggest that an invidious homunculus might reside in the
heads of most judges in the United States, with the potential to pro-
duce racially biased distortions in the administration of justice.
It is worth noting, however, that the research on so-called
"chronic egalitarians" suggests that this result was not inevitable.
Some whites with longstanding and intense personal commitments to
eradicating bias in themselves-chronic egalitarians-do not exhibit
the preference for whites over blacks on the IAT that most white
116 Sift Carpenter, Buried Prejudice: The Bigot in Your Brain, Sci. Am. MIND, May
2008, at 32, 32.
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adults show.1 17 Despite their professional commitment to the equal
application of the law, judges do not appear to have the same habits of
mind as the chronic egalitarians. The proportion of white judges in
our study who revealed automatic associations of white with good and
black with bad was, if anything, slightly higher than the proportion
found in the online surveys of white Americans. Thus, a professional
commitment to equality, unlike a personal commitment to the same
ideal, appears to have limited impact on automatic racial associations,
at least among the judges in our study. Alternatively, the overrepre-
sentation of black Americans among the criminal defendants who
appear in front of judges might produce invidious associations that
overwhelm their professional commitment. In either case, our find-
ings are consistent with the implicit associations found among capital
defense attorneys. White capital defense attorneys, another group
which might be expected to have strong professional commitments to
the norm of racial equality,' 18 exhibit the same automatic preference
for whites as the general population.' 1 9
Taken together, then, the research on judges and capital defense
attorneys raises serious concerns about the role that unconscious bias
might play in the criminal justice system. Jurors are drawn from ran-
domly selected adults, and a majority of white jurors will harbor
implicit white preferences. If police, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and
defense attorneys all harbor anti-black preferences, then the system
would appear to have limited safeguards to protect black defendants
from bias. Based on JAT scores alone, both black judges and black
jurors seem to be less biased than either white judges or white jurors,
because black Americans show less implicit bias than white Americans.
But even considerable numbers of blacks express implicit biases. Per-
haps the only entity in the system that might avoid the influence of
the bigot in the brain is a diversely composed jury.
That said, the rest of our results call into question the importance
of JAT scores alone as a metric to evaluate the potential bias of deci-
sionmakers in the legal system. Our second and third conclusions
show that implicit biases can translate into biased decisionmaking
under certain circumstances, but that they do not do so consistently.
117 See Gordon B. Moskowitz & Amanda R. Salomon, Preconsciously Controlling
Stereotyping: Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18
Soc. COGNITION 151, 155 (2000).
118 See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1540 (2004) ("One would hope that those
who represent capital defendants (or at least African-American capital defendants)
would themselves be free of racialized thinking ... .
119 Id. at 1546-48.
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Implicit associations influenced judges-both black judges and
white judges-when we manipulated the race of the defendant by sub-
liminal methods. Judges with strong white preferences on the IAT
made somewhat harsher judgments of the juvenile defendants after
being exposed to the black subliminal prime, and judges with strong
black preferences on the IAT were somewhat more lenient after expo-
sure to the black subliminal prime. In effect, the subliminal processes
triggered unconscious bias, and in just the way that might be
expected.
The story for the explicit manipulation of race is more compli-
cated, however. The white judges, unlike the white adults in the Som-
mers and Ellsworth study,120 treated African American and Caucasian
defendants comparably. But the proper interpretation of this finding
is unclear. We observed a trend among the white judges in that the
higher their white preference, the more favorably they treated the Afri-
can American defendant in the battery case. Thus, among the white
judges, implicit bias did not translate into racial disparities when the
race of the defendant was clearly identified in an experimental
setting.
We believe that the data demonstrate that the white judges were
attempting to compensate for unconscious racial biases in their deci-
sionmaking. These judges were, we believe, highly motivated to avoid
making biased judgments, at least in our study. Codes ofjudicial con-
duct demand that judges make unbiased decisions, at least in our
study.12' Moreover, impartiality is a prominent element in almost
every widely accepted definition of the judicial role. 122 Judges take
these norms seriously. When the materials identified the race of the
defendant in a prominent way, the white judges probably engaged in
cognitive correction to avoid the appearance of bias.
The white judges in our study behaved much like the subjects in
other studies who were highly motivated to avoid bias in performing
an assigned task. 123 What made our white judges different from the
subjects studied by these other researchers is that most of the judges
reported that they suspected racial bias was being studied, despite the
120 See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 102, at 217.
121 See MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, at Canon 2 (2008) ("Ajudge shall per-
form the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.").
122 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, BLACK LETrER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OFJUDI-
CtAL PERFORMANCE, at Guideline 5-2.3 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/
lawyersconf/pdf/jpec final.pdf (prescribing "[a]bsence of favor or disfavor toward
anyone, including but not limited to favor or disfavor based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status").
123 See Glaser & Knowles, supra note 39, at 171.
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fact that the only cue they received was the explicit mention of the
defendant's race.124 We think this report was truthful, given that the
judges behaved the same way as other white subjects who attempted to
avoid the influence of implicit bias.
The black judges responded somewhat differently to the overt
labeling of the defendant's race. Like the white judges, the black
judges in our study also reported being aware of the subject of the
study, yet they showed a correlation between implicit associations and
judgment when race was explicitly manipulated. Among these judges,
a greater white preference produced a greater propensity to convict
the African American defendant. In other words, the black judges
clearly reacted differently when they were conscious that race was
being manipulated-a difference that correlated with their score on
the race IAT.
We do not conclude, however, that black judges are less con-
cerned about avoiding biased decisionmaking than white judges. We
have no doubt that the professional norms against bias concern the
black judges just as deeply as their white counterparts-if not more so.
And we are mindful that research on the effect of race on judges'
decisions in actual cases demonstrates no clear effects. 125 We believe
that both white and black judges were motivated to avoid showing
racial bias.
Why then did the black judges produce different results? We can
only speculate, but we suspect that both groups ofjudges were keen to
avoid appearing to favor the white defendant (or conversely, wanted
to avoid appearing to disfavor the black defendant). Black judges,
however, might have been less concerned with appearing to favor the
black defendant than the white judges. Those black judges who
expressed a white preference, however, behaved more like their white
counterparts in this regard, thereby producing a correlation between
verdict and IAT score among black judges.
We also cannot ignore the possibility that the judges were react-
ing to the race of the victim, rather than (or in addition to) the race
of the defendant. In all cases, we identified the victim as the opposite
124 During our presentation, one of us asked for a show of hands to indicate how
many thought we were studying race. While not the most ideal way to make this
inquiry, and while we did not keep a precise count, most of the judges raised their
hands.
125 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Black Judges and Ascriptive Group Identification, in
NoRMs AND THE LAW 208, 215 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) ("The most noteworthy
feature of these studies is that they find no consistent, and only a few salient, differ-
ences in decisionmaking that correlate with the race of the judge.").
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race as the defendant. Furthermore, black judges might have reacted
differently to the fact that the case involved a cross-racial crime.
Given our results, we cannot definitively ascribe continuing racial
disparities in the criminal justice system to unconscious bias. We nev-
ertheless can draw some firm conclusions. First, implicit biases are
widespread among judges. Second, these biases can influence their
judgment. Finally, judges seem to be aware of the potential for bias in
themselves and possess the cognitive skills necessary to avoid its influ-
ence. When they are motivated to avoid the appearance of bias, and
face clear cues that risk a charge of bias, they can compensate for
implicit bias.
Whether the judges engage their abilities to avoid bias on a con-
tinual basis in their own courtrooms, however, is unclear. Judges are
subject to the same significant professional norms to avoid prejudice
in their courtrooms that they carried with them into our study. And
judges might well point to our study as evidence that they avoid bias in
their own courtrooms, where the race of defendants is often reasona-
bly clear, and they never face subliminal cues. But courtrooms can be
busy places that do not afford judges the time necessary to engage the
corrective cognitive mechanisms that they seem to possess. And even
though many decisions are made on papers only, judges might unwit-
tingly react to names or neighborhoods that are associated with cer-
tain races. Control of implicit bias requires active, conscious
control.' 26 Judges who, due to time pressure or other distractions, do
not actively engage in an effort to control the "bigot in the brain" are
apt to behave just as the judges in our study in which we subliminally
primed with race-related words. Moreover, our data do not permit us
to determine whether a desire to control bias or avoid the appearance
of bias motivates judges in their courtrooms the way it seemed to in
our study.
Furthermore, judges might be overconfident about their abilities
to control their own biases. In recently collected data, we asked a
group of judges attending an educational conference to rate their
ability to "avoid racial prejudice in decisionmaking" relative to other
judges who were attending the same conference. Ninety-seven per-
cent (thirty-five out of thirty-six) of the judges placed themselves in
the top half and fifty percent (eighteen out of thirty-six) placed them-
selves in the top quartile, even though by definition, only fifty percent
can be above the median, and only twenty-five percent can be in the
126 See Carpenter, supra note 116, at 37-38.
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top quartile. 27 We worry that this result means that judges are over-
confident about their ability to avoid the influence of race and hence
fail to engage in corrective processes on all occasions.
To be sure, this is only one study, and it has its limitations. The
results might be the product of the particular judges who participated
in our study, or the materials we used, or even the fact that hypotheti-
cal scenarios were used. Most importantly, we cannot determine
whether the mental processes of judges on the bench more closely
resemble those of judges subliminally primed with race or those for
whom race was explicitly manipulated. Thus, it is not clear how
implicit racial bias influences judicial decisionmaking in court, but
our study suggests, at a minimum, that there is a sizeable risk of such
influence, so we turn in the next Part to reforms the criminal justice
system might consider implementing.
IV. MITIGATING IMPLICIT BIAS IN COURT
To minimize the risk that unconscious or implicit bias will lead to
biased decisions in court, the criminal justice system could take sev-
eral steps. These include exposing judges to stereotype-incongruent
models, providing testing and training, auditing judicial decisions,
and altering courtroom practices. Taking these steps would both facil-
itate the reduction of unconscious biases and encourage judges to use
their abilities to compensate for those biases.
A. Exposure to Stereotype-Incongruent Models
Several scholars have suggested that society might try to reduce
the presence of unconscious biases by exposing decisionmakers to
127 These data were collected by us at a conference of New York City administra-
tive law judges in the summer of 2008. As one of the questions, we asked the
following:
Relative to the other judges attending this conference, how would you rate
yourself on the following:
Avoiding racial bias in making decisions
__ In the highest quartile (meaning that you are more skilled at this
than 75% of the judges attending this conference)
__ In the second highest quartile (meaning that you are more skilled at
this than 50% of the judges in this room, but less skilled than 25% of the
judges attending this conference)
__ In the second lowest quartile (meaning that you are more skilled at
this than 25% of the judges in this room, but less skilled than 50% of the
judges attending this conference)
__ In the lowest quartile (meaning that you are less skilled at this than
75% of the judges attending this conference).
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stereotype-incongruent models. 128 This suggestion, in fact, probably
represents the dominant policy proposal among legal scholars who
write about unconscious bias. 129 We certainly agree, for example, that
posting a portrait of President Obama alongside the parade of mostly
white male judges in many courtrooms would be an inexpensive, laud-
able intervention.
Our results, however, also raise questions about the effectiveness
of this proposal. The white judges from the eastern jurisdiction in our
study showed a strong set of implicit biases, even though the jurisdic-
tion consists of roughly half white judges and half black judges.
Indeed, the level of implicit bias in this group of judges was only
slightly smaller than that of the western jurisdiction, which included
only two black judges (along with thirty-six white, five Latino, and two
Asian judges). Exposure to a group of esteemed black colleagues
apparently is not enough to counteract the societal influences that
lead to implicit biases.
Consciously attempting to change implicit associations might be
too difficult for judges. Most judges have little control over their
dockets, which tend to include an overrepresentation of black crimi-
nal defendants. 130 Frequent exposure to black criminal defendants is
apt to perpetuate negative associations with black Americans. This
exposure perhaps explains why capital defense attorneys harbor nega-
tive associations with blacks, 3 1 and might explain why we found
slightly greater negative associations among the white judges than the
population as a whole (although as we noted above, the latter finding
might have other causes).
B. Testing and Training
The criminal justice system might test candidates for judicial
office using the IAT or other devices to determine whether they pos-
sess implicit biases. We do not suggest that people who display strong
128 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 988-90; Kang & Banaji, supra note 7, at
1105-08.
129 See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 7, at 1112 ("In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court
emphasized that student diversity was valuable because it could help 'break down
racial stereotypes.'" (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003))); see also
Kang, supra note 8, at 1579-83 (arguing that public broadcasting should be regulated
so as to promote positive images of minorities).
130 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (stating that an estimated forty percent of defendants were
black).
131 See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 118, at 1553-56.
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white preferences on the IAT should be barred from serving as judges,
nor do we even support using the IAT as a measure of qualification to
serve on the bench.1 32 The direct link between JAT score and deci-
sionmaking is far too tenuous for such a radical recommendation.
And our data show that judges can overcome these implicit biases at
least to some extent and under some circumstances. Rather, knowing
a judge's IAT score might serve two other purposes. First, it might
help newly elected or appointed judges understand the extent to
which they have implicit biases and alert them to the need to correct
for those biases on the job.133 Second, it might enable the system to
provide targeted training about bias to new judges.1 3 4
Judicial training should not end with new judges, however.
Training for sitting judges is also important. Judicial education is
common these days, but one problem with it, at least as it exists at this
time, is that it is seldom accompanied by any testing of the individual
judge's susceptibility to implicit bias, or any analysis of the judge's own
decisions, so the judges are less likely to appreciate and internalize the
risks of implicit bias.135 As Timothy Wilson and his colleagues have
observed, "people's default response is to assume that theirjudgments
are uncontaminated. '" 136 Surely this is true of judges as well. Moreo-
ver, because people are prone to egocentric bias, they readily assume
that they are better than average, or the factors that might induce
others to make poor or biased decisions would not affect their own
decisions. Our research demonstrates that judges are inclined to
make the same sorts of favorable assumptions about their own abilities
that non-judges do. 137 Therefore, while education regarding implicit
bias as a general matter might be useful, specific training revealing
the vulnerabilities of the judges being trained would be more
useful. 138
Another problem with training is that although insight into the
direction of a bias frequently can be gained, insight into the magni-
132 Others have made tentative suggestions that the IAT be used as a screening
device for certain professions. See, e.g., IAN AvRs, PERVASIVE PREJUDIcE? 424 (2001)
("Implicit attitude testing might also itself be used as a criterion for hiring both gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental actors.").
133 Green et al., supra note 10, at 1237 ("These findings support the lAT's value as
an educational tool.").
134 See id. (recommending "securely and privately administered IATs to increase
physicians' awareness of unconscious bias").
135 See Carpenter, supra note 116, at 32.
136 Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 185, 190 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
137 See Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 58, at 814-15.
138 See Green et al., supra note 10, at 1237.
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tude of that bias cannot. One group of psychologists provided the
following example:
Consider Ms. Green, a partner in a prestigious law firm, who is
interviewing candidates for the position of an associate in her firm.
When she interviews Mr. Jones, a young African-American attorney,
she has an immediate negative impression, finding him to be arro-
gant and lacking the kind of brilliance she looks for in new associ-
ates. Ms. Green decides that her impression of Mr. Jones was
accurate and at a meeting of the partners, argues against hiring
him. She wonders, however, whether her negative evaluation was
influenced by Mr. Jones' race.13 9
The psychologists explained:
Ms. Green may know that her impression of Mr. Jones is unfairly
negative and want to avoid this bias, but have no idea of the extent
of the bias. Should she change her evaluation from "Should not be
hired" to "Barely acceptable" or to "Best applicant I've seen in
years"? 140
This scenario illustrates the problem well. How is one to know if
correction is warranted, and if so, how much?1 4 1 In a circumstance
like the one depicted above or like any of the circumstances described
in the materials included in our study, there is a risk of insufficient
correction, unnecessary correction, or even overcorrection, resulting
in a decision that is distorted as a result of the adjustment, but simply
in the opposite direction. 142 Testing might mitigate this problem by
139 Wilson et al., supra note 136, at 185.
140 Id. at 187.
141 See id. at 191 ("Three kinds of errors have been found: insufficient correction
(debiasing in the direction of accuracy that does not go far enough), unnecessary cor-
rection (debiasing when there was no bias to start with), and overcorrection (too much
debiasing, such that judgments end up biased in the opposite direction).").
142 See id. (suggesting that people's "corrected judgments might be worse than
their uncorrected ones"); see also Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stere-
otyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 239-40 (2005) ("One major
problem for any correction strategy is determining the magnitude of the correction
required. Unfortunately, people are not very good at this determination. Some
research suggests that among those who are very motivated to avoid discrimination,
overcorrection is a common problem. ... A second problem is that a correction
strategy appears to require significant cognitive resources .... (citations omitted));
id. at 241-42 ("'[T]o consciously and willfully regulate one's own ... evaluations
[and] decisions . . . requires considerable effort and is relatively slow. Moreover, it
appears to require a limited resource that is quickly used up, so conscious self-regula-
tory acts can only occur sparingly and for a short time.'" (omissions in original)
(quotingJohn A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54
AM. PSYCHOL. 462, 476 (1999))).
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helping judges appreciate how much compensation or correction is
needed.
The results of our study are thus somewhat surprising in that the
white judges' corrections in the case in which the defendant's race was
explicit seemed to be neither too much nor too little. On average,
these judges treated white and black defendants about the same. This
result cannot, however, reasonably be taken as meaning that judges
correct for the influence of implicit bias perfectly in all cases in which
they attempt to do so. We presented only one scenario-other cases
might produce overcompensation or undercompensation. And indi-
vidual judges are apt to vary in terms of their willingness or ability to
correct for the influence of unconscious racial bias. Also, the white
judges were slightly less harsh on the black defendants. The differ-
ence simply failed to rise to the level of statistical significance, as it was
small (only six percentage points). Had we collected data on a thou-
sand judges rather than a hundred, we might have begun to observe
some overcompensation or undercompensation.
C. Auditing
The criminal justice system could also implement an auditing
program to evaluate the decisions of individual judges in order to
determine whether they appear to be influenced by implicit bias. For
example, judges' discretionary determinations, such as bail-setting,
sentencing, or child-custody allocation, could be audited periodically
to determine whether they exhibit patterns indicative of implicit bias.
Such proposals have been suggested as correctives for umpires in
Major League Baseball and referees in the National Basketball Associ-
ation after both groups displayed evidence of racial bias in their
judgments. 143
Auditing could provide a couple of benefits. First, it would obvi-
ously increase the available data regarding the extent to which bias
affects judicial decisionmaking. Second, it could enhance the
accountability of judicial decisionmaking. I 44 Unfortunately, judges
operate in an institutional context that provides little accountability,
at least in the sense that they receive little prompt and useful feed-
143 See Christopher A. Parsons et al., Strike Three: Umpires'Demand for Discrimination
24-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13665,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1077091; Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers,
Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 13206, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997562.
144 Accountability improves performance in other contexts, so it likely would do so
forjudges as well. SeeJennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accountingfor the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 270-71 (1999).
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back.1 45 Existing forms of accountability, such as appellate review or
retention elections, primarily focus on ajudge's performance in a par-
ticular case, not on the systematic study of long-term patterns within a
judge's performance that might reveal implicit bias. 146
D. Altering Courtroom Practices
In addition to providing training or implementing auditing pro-
grams, the criminal justice system could also alter practices in the
courtroom to minimize the untoward impact of unconscious bias. For
example, the system could expand the use of threejudge courts. 147
Research reveals that improving the diversity of appellate court panels
can affect outcomes. One study found that "adding a female judge to
the panel more than doubled the probability that a male judge ruled
for the plaintiff in sexual harassment cases ... and nearly tripled this
probability in sex discrimination cases."'1 48 In trial courts, judges typi-
cally decide such issues alone, so adopting this mechanism would
require major structural changes. Although convening a three-judge
trial court was once required by statute when the constitutionality of a
state's statute was at issue, 149 three-judge trial courts are virtually non-
existent today.150 The inefficiency of having three judges decide cases
that one judge might be able to decide nearly as well led to their
demise, and this measure might simply be too costly to resurrect.
Another possibility would be to increase the depth of appellate
scrutiny, such as by employing de novo review rather than clear error
review, in cases in which particular trial court findings of fact might be
tainted by implicit bias. For example, there is some evidence that
male judges may be less hospitable to sex discrimination claims than
they ought to be.151 If that bias does exist, less deferential appellate
review by a diverse panel might offer a partial solution.
145 See Guthrie et al., How Judges Decide, supra note 58, at 32.
146 See, e.g., Jean E. Dubofsky, Judicial Peiformance Review: A Balance Between Judicial
Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 320-22 (2007)
(explaining that the judicial performance review system in Colorado focuses only on a
judge's performance in a particular case).
147 See Michel E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge
District Court, 70 U. PITr. L. Rrv. 101, 128-134 (2008).
148 Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmak-
ing in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1778 (2005).
149 Note, Judicial Limitation of Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction, 85 YALE L.J. 564, 564
(1976).
150 Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Cir-
cuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1225 (1974).
151 See Peresie, supra note 148, at 1778.
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CONCLUSION
Our study contains both bad news and good news about implicit
biases amongjudges. As expected, we found that judges, like the rest
of us, possess implicit biases. We also found that these biases have the
potential to influence judgments in criminal cases, at least in those
circumstances where judges are not guarding against them. On the
other hand, we found that the judges managed, for the most part, to
avoid the influence of unconscious biases when they were told of the
defendant's race.
The presence of implicit racial bias among judges-even if its
impact on actual cases is uncertain-should sound a cautionary note
for those involved in the criminal justice system. To prevent implicit
biases from influencing actual cases, we have identified several
reforms that the criminal justice system could implement, ranging
from relatively inexpensive measures, like implementing focused judi-
cial training and testing, to relatively expensive measures, like altering
courtroom practices. To render justice blind, as it is supposed to be,
these reforms are worth considering.
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APPENDIX A: MATERLLs
Shoplifter Case
You are presiding over a case involving criminal charges against a
juvenile, William T. William is a 13-year-old who was arrested for shop-
lifting in a large, upscale toy store in __ . He has no prior record.
You are trying to get a sense of the case and the only facts available to
you follow:
According to a store clerk, on Saturday, April 2, at about two
o'clock in the afternoon, the clerk observed William putting vide-
ogames under his shirt. The clerk rang for a security guard, but
before the guard arrived, the boy started to leave the store. When
the clerk grabbed William, the boy dropped the toys and kicked
him in an attempt to escape. A uniformed security guard arrived as
the clerk let go of William, and when the guard told the boy to stop,
he did.
According to the security guard, when he arrived he observed
five items on the floor in front of William. The prices of those items
together added up to $90. He said that William told him that he
was shopping, and showed him $10 he had brought along with
which to make purchases. William claimed that he had used his
shirt as a sort of pouch to hold the items he was looking at. William
also told the guard he was startled when grabbed by someone from
behind, and then tripped, but that he did not kick anyone.
1. In your opinion, without regard to the options actually availa-
ble in this kind of situation, what would be the most appropriate dis-
position of this case?
- 1) Dismiss it with an oral warning
__ 2) Adjourn the case in contemplation of dismissal
(assuming William gets in no further trouble)
-_3) Put William on probation for six months or less
-_4) Put William on probation for more than six months
__ 5) Commit William to a juvenile detention facility for six
months or less
__ 6) Commit William to a juvenile detention facility for more
than six months
-_7) Transfer William to adult court
2. In your opinion, on a scale of one to seven, how likely is it that
William will later commit a crime similar to the one with which he is
charged?
Very Likely Not at all Likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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3. In your opinion, on a scale of one to seven, how likely is it that
William will commit more serious crimes in the future?
Very Likely Not at all Likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Robbery Case
You are presiding over a case involving criminal charges against a
juvenile, Michael S., who was arrested for armed robbery of a gas sta-
tion when he was two days shy of his seventeenth birthday. He has
one prior arrest for a fight in the school lunchroom the previous year.
You are trying to get a sense of the case and the only facts available to
you follow:
According to the gas station clerk, on Friday, March 17, at
about seven in the evening, she heard a male voice say, "Don't look
at me, but give me the money." She kept her eyes down, and as she
opened the cash register, the man said, "I could shoot you, don't
think I won't." She handed him the drawer's contents ($267.60)
and saw him run out the door with a gun. After he jumped into the
passenger side of a car and it left, she called the police.
According to the responding officer, the clerk could not iden-
tify the robber, but a customer said he thought he recognized
Michael, and gave the officer Michael's name and address.
Michael's mother was home, and at nine forty-five, Michael walked
in the door, was given Miranda warnings, and waived his rights. He
first stated that he had just been hanging around with friends, not
doing anything special. After the officer asked who the friends
were, Michael admitted that he had walked into the gas station with
a gun. He told the officer that he said to the clerk, "Give me the
money, please. I don't want to hurt you." Michael insisted that the
gun was not loaded and that he no longer had it. He said that the
money was gone, that he was sorry, and would pay it back. When
asked why he did it, Michael said that his friends had dared him, but
he would not reveal who those friends were, or to whom the gun
belonged.
1. In your opinion, without regard to the options actually availa-
ble in this kind of situation, what would be the most appropriate dis-
position of this case?
___ 1) Dismiss it with an oral warning
2) Adjourn the case in contemplation of dismissal (assum-
ing Michael gets in no further trouble)
___ 3) Put Michael on probation for six months or less
4) Put Michael on probation for more than six months
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___ 5) Commit Michael to a juvenile detention facility for six
months or less
6) Commit Michael to a juvenile detention facility for
more than six months
7) Transfer Michael to adult court
2. In your opinion, on a scale of one to seven, how likely is it that
Michael will later commit a crime similar to the one with which he is
charged?
Very Likely Not at all Likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. In your opinion, on a scale of one to seven, how likely is it that
Michael will commit more serious crimes in the future?
Very Likely Not at all Likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Battery Case
Defendant: Andr6 Barkley, 6'0", 175 lbs., African American male,
18 years old, student
Alleged Victim: Matthew Clinton, 6'2", 185 lbs., Caucasian male, 16
years old, student
Charge- One Count of Battery with Serious Bodily Injury
Prosecution
The prosecution claims that Andr6 Barkley is guilty of battery
with serious bodily injury. Barkley was the starting point guard on the
high school basketball team, but the team had been struggling, and
the coach decided to bench him in favor of a younger, less exper-
ienced player named Matthew Clinton. Before the first game after the
lineup change, Barkley approached Clinton in the locker room and
began yelling at him. Witnesses explain that the frustrated defendant
told Clinton, "You aren't half the player I am, you must be kissing
Coach's ass pretty hard to be starting."
When other teammates stepped between the two players, Barkley
told them to get out of the way. When two other players then grabbed
Barkley and tried to restrain him, the defendant threw them off,
pushed Clinton into a row of lockers, and ran out of the room,
according to prosecution witnesses. As a result of this fall, two of Clin-
ton's teeth were chipped and he was knocked unconscious. The pros-
ecution claims that Barkley has shown no remorse for his crime, and
has even expressed to friends that Clinton "only got what he had
coming."
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Defense
The defense claims that Barkley was merely acting in self-defense,
and that Clinton's injuries were accidental. According to an assistant
coach, Barkley did not get along with many people on the team and
had been the subject of obscene remarks and unfair criticism from
many of his teammates throughout the season. Barkley claims that he
was afraid for his own safety during the altercation in the locker room
and "definitely felt ganged up on."
Barkley admits he "might have been aggressive towards Matthew
and started the whole thing," but says that he was just frustrated and
the argument was "nothing that should have started a big locker room
fight or anything." Barkley claims that when several other players
grabbed him from behind for no reason, he tried to break free and
must have accidentally knocked into Clinton in the attempt to get out
of the locker room. He explained that the reason he never apolo-
gized to Clinton in the hospital was that he "didn't think he'd want to
see me," but Barkley did say he "was truly, truly sorry" that Clinton had
been injured.
1. Based on the available evidence, if this were a bench trial,
would you convict the defendant?
Yes No
2. How confident are you that your judgment is correct?
Very Confident Not at all Confident
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Demographic Questions Provided to Judges
What is the title of the judicial position you currently hold?
How many years have you served as a Judge (in any position)?
__ years
Please identify your gender:
male female
During your judicial career, approximately what percentage of your
time has been devoted to the following areas:
Criminal cases
Civil cases
Family law cases
Probate or trusts
Other
1236 [VOL. 84:3
2009] UNCONSCIOUS RACIAL BIAS 1237
Which of the two major political parties in the United States most
closely matches your own political beliefs?
-The Republican Party
-The Democratic Party
Please identify your race (Check all that apply)
White (non-Hispanic)
Black or African American
-Hispanic or Latino
Asian
Native American or Pacific Islander
Other
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APPENDIX B: IAT PROCEDURE
We used seven rounds of trials to produce the IAT score. Rounds
one, two, three, five, and six are essentially practice rounds designed
to minimize order effects and variation associated with unfamiliarity
with the task. The study begins with one round in which the partici-
pants only sort black and white faces. In this round the word "White"
appeared in the upper left and the word "Black" appeared in the
upper right of the screen. In each trial, one of ten faces, five white
and five black, appeared in the middle of the screen. 152 The faces
appeared at random, although an equal number of white and black
faces appeared in the sixteen trials. 153
The instructions before each round informed the judges as to
what they would be sorting in the upcoming round. For example, in
the first round, the instructions indicated that the judge should press
the "E" key (labeled with a red dot) if a white face appeared and the
"I" key (also labeled with a red dot) if a black face appeared. The
materials also state that if the judge pressed the correct key, the next
face would appear; if the judge pressed the wrong key, a red "X"
would appear. These instructions were similar in all seven rounds of
the IAT.
1 5 4
The remaining six rounds were similar to the first, although they
varied the stimuli and categories. In the second round, instead of the
152 The faces were taken from the Project Implicit website. See Brian A. Nosek et
al., Project Implicit, Stimulus Materials (2006), http://www.projectimplicit.net/stim-
uli.php. They include only the center of the face, with ears, hair, and anything below
the chin cropped out. None of the faces has facial hair, eyeglasses, or distinguishing
features. Id. (providing faces that can be downloaded under the "race faces" stimulus
set).
153 In this respect we varied from the procedures recommended by Greenwald
and his colleagues, see Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 198, by reducing the practice
rounds from the twenty they suggested to sixteen. We did this in the interest of saving
time. We did retain the forty trials in the critical rounds. We had more time available
in the western jurisdiction, and increased the length of rounds three and six to twenty
trials.
154 The exact instructions were as follows:
In the first round, the two CATEGORIES that you are to distinguish are:
BLACK vs. WHITE faces.
Press the "E" key if the TARGET is a WHITE face.
Press the "I" key if the TARGET is a BLACK face.
Remember that an "X" will appear when you make an error. Whenever the
"X" appears, correct the mistake by pressing the other key.
Please respond AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, but don't respond so fast that
you make many errors. (Occasional errors are okay.)
Press the space bar when you are ready to begin.
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black and white faces, the computer presented good and bad words.
These consisted of seven words with positive associations (Joy, Love,
Peace, Wonderful, Pleasure, Friend, Laughter, Happy) and seven
words with negative associations (Agony, Terrible, Horrible, Nasty,
Evil, War, Awful, Failure). Like the faces, these words were taken from
previous work on the LAT. Throughout the trials in the second round,
the word "Good" remained in the upper-left of the computer screen
and the word "Bad" remained in the upper-right of the computer
screen. The judges were instructed in a similar fashion to round one,
to press the "E" key when a good word appeared in the center of the
screen and to press the "I" key when a bad word appeared in the
center of the screen.
The third round combined the tasks in the first two rounds. The
words "White or Good" appeared in the upper-left of the computer
screen and the words "Black or Bad" appeared in the upper-right of
the computer screen. Thus, the task presented both categories in the
same spatial location as they had been in the first two rounds. The
instructions indicated to the judge that either a white or black face or
a good or bad word would appear in the center of the computer
screen. The instructions continued that the judges should press the
"E" key if either a white face or a good word appeared and the "I" key
if either a black face or a bad word appeared. Although the computer
selected randomly from the faces and concept words, the computer
presented an equal number of names and faces of both types. We
presented the judges with sixteen trials of this task
Round four was identical to round three in every respect except
that the computer presented forty trials, rather than sixteen.
Round five prepared the judges for the reverse association. To
create the reversal, the spatial locations of the good and bad words
were reversed. The word "Bad" was moved to the left and the word
"Good" was moved to the right. The fifth round was thus identical to
the second round in that the computer presented only the good and
bad words, but that the computer presented the words in their new
locations. The instructions were also identical to those of round two
except that they identified the new locations and corresponding
response keys for the words.
The penultimate round paired the good and bad words in their
new locations with the black and white labels in their original loca-
tion. Thus, the words "White or Bad" appeared in the upper left and
the words "Black or Good" appeared in the upper right. The instruc-
tions resembled those for rounds three and four. They indicated,
however, that judges should press the "E" key if a white face or bad
word appeared and to press the "I" key if a black face or good word
200 91 1239
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appeared. Round six, like the other practice rounds, consisted of six-
teen trials.
Round seven was identical to round six in every respect except
that the computer presented forty trials, rather than sixteen. The
computer recorded the reaction times between the presentation of
the stimuli and the time of the correct response for all judges in all
rounds. The computer also recorded which stimuli it presented and
whether an error occurred.
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APPENDIX C: IAT SCORING
Scoring the IAT requires researchers to make several judgments
about the data. It requires deciding which of the seven rounds to use
(some studies make use of the practice rounds); how to manage laten-
cies that seem too long or too short; how to assess erroneous
responses; how to identify and score participants who respond too
slowly, too quickly, or made too many errors; whether to standardize
the responses; and whether to use every round in a trial (or drop the
first two, which commonly produce excessively long latencies).
Greenwald and his colleagues tested essentially all variations on
answers to these issues and produced a scoring method that they
believe maximizes the correlation between the IAT and observed
behavior.155
We used two different scoring methods. First, for each judge, we
calculated the difference between the average latency in the stereo-
type-congruent rounds in which the judges sorted white/good versus
black/bad and the average latency in the stereotype-incongruent
rounds in which the judges sorted white/bad versus black/good. This
*procedure follows the method that other researchers have used in
reporting data from hundreds of thousands of participants collected
on the Internet. 156 Hence, we can compare this average score with
that of large groups of ordinary adults. (We describe this procedure
at greater length below.)
In an exhaustive review of IAT methodology, however, Greenwald
and his colleagues concluded that the average difference might not be
the best measure of implicit associations. 157 These researchers found
that people who are slower on the task produce larger differences in
their IAT scores.158 This tendency confounds the IAT score, as people
who are simply less facile with a keyboard will appear to have stronger
stereotypic associations. Furthermore, Greenwald and his colleagues
also found that the average difference did not correlate as well with
people's decisions and behavior as other scoring methods. 159 After
conducting their review, Greenwald and his colleagues identified a
preferred scoring method, which we followed to assess the correlation
between IAT effects and judges' decisions.1 60 The method essentially
uses the mean difference for each participant divided by the standard
155 Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 212-15.
156 Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 103-04.
157 Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 212-15.
158 Id. at 201-02.
159 Id. at 203.
160 Id. at 214 tbl.4.
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deviation of that participant's response latencies, although it includes
some variations. (We also describe this procedure at greater length
below.)
1. Mean-Difference IAT Score Calculation
To calculate the mean-difference LAT score, we largely followed
the procedures outlined in Nosek and his colleagues' report of IAT
scores from tens of thousands of people collected through the
Internet. 161 We also wanted to compare our results with the more
detailed, contemporary Internet data collected and reported on the
"Project Implicit" website, which appears to use the same scoring
method. 162 Because the data in these studies come from voluntary
participants who access the site on the Internet, the authors have
adopted a number of techniques for excluding data from participants
who may have wandered off during the study or are otherwise not fully
engaged with the tasks. 163 While such techniques are less appropriate
for our participants, who were engaged in person, we followed the
Project Implicit scoring methods to facilitate a comparison.
The authors of the Internet study first adjusted raw latency scores
that seemed much slower or faster than participants who are fully
engaged with the task. The researchers treat any latency larger than
3000 milliseconds (ms) as 3000 ms, and any latency shorter than 300
ms as 300 ms. 1 64 The researchers also eliminated the first two trials in
all rounds from consideration, having found that these rounds often
displayed an erratic pattern of long latencies-presumably because
participants commonly begin the task, and then pause to get settled
in.165 These researchers also excluded participants who failed to per-
form to certain criteria. They excluded participants who exhibited
overall average latencies in the two critical rounds greater than 1800
Ins, or who displayed average latencies in either of the two critical
rounds (four or seven) greater than 1500 ms.1 66 They also excluded
participants who produced any critical round in which more than
twenty-five percent of the latencies were less than 300 ms. 16 7 Finally,
they excluded participants who made more than ten errors in any crit-
161 Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 103-04.
162 Project Implicit, Background Information (2002), https://implicit.harvard.
edu/implicit/demo/background/index.jsp (last visited on Mar. 9, 2009).
163 See Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 104.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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ical round.168 These researchers report that these criteria resulted in
the exclusion of fifteen percent of their subjects.169 After these adjust-
ments and exclusions, these researchers calculated the mean differ-
ence between the critical stereotype-congruent round (either round
four or seven) and the stereotype-incongruent rounds (either round
four or seven). 170
We followed these procedures to calculate the mean LAT score
for the judges in our study. We capped latencies greater than 3000 ms
as 3000 ms, and raised latencies lower than 300 ms to 300 ms. 1 7 1 We
also discarded the first two rounds from the analysis. We excluded the
results of the race IAT from six judges (or 4.5%) who produced either
mean latencies greater than 1800 ms in one of the two critical rounds
of the race IAT or a mean across both rounds greater than 1500 ms. 1 72
Similarly, we excluded the results of the gender JAT from ten judges
(or 7.5%) who violated one or both of these criteria.173 Nosek and his
colleagues reported that they eliminated two percent of their partici-
pants for being too slow,' 74 whereas we eliminated more. At the same
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 None of the judges provided latencies that were less than 300 ms in either of
the two critical rounds measuring the race IAT; two of the judges provided responses
that were faster than 300 ms in the gender IAT (one round each). Many more of the
judges produced latencies that exceeded 3000 ms. On the race IAT, fifty-eight judges
(or 50.4%) produced at least one latency greater than 3000 ms in the stereotype-
congruent round (round four). Specifically, in the stereotype-congruent round:
thirty-three judges produced one long latency; twenty produced two; three produced
three; and two produced four. In the stereotype-incongruent round on the race IAT
(round seven), sixty-eight judges (or 59.1%) produced at least one latency greater
than 3000 ms. Specifically, in the stereotype-incongruent round: thirty-three judges
produced one long latency; twelve produced two; ten produced three; four produced
four; two produced five; four produced six; and three produced seven. On the gen-
der IAT, fifty-seven judges (or 49.6%) produced at least one latency greater than 3000
ms in the stereotype-congruent round (round seven). Specifically, in the stereotype-
congruent round: thirty-six judges produced one long latency; seven produced two;
nine produced three; three produced four; one produced five; and one produced
eight. In the stereotype-incongruent round on the gender IAT (round four), fifty-six
judges (or 48.7%) produced at least one latency greater than 3000 ms. Specifically, in
the stereotype-incongruent round: twenty-seven judges produced one long latency;
fifteen produced two; six produced three; three produced four; two produced five;
one produced six; and one produced seven. Note that because some of these long
latencies fell into the first two rounds, they are not included in the analysis.
172 One of the judges violated both criteria. We calculated both means after
excluding the first two rounds.
173 Four judges violated both criteria.
174 Nosek et al., supra note 17, at 104.
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time, none of the judges in our studies produced more than a twenty-
five percent error rate in either of the critical rounds in either IAT.
By contrast, Nosek and his colleagues eliminated roughly thirteen per-
cent of their participants for having high error rates. 175 The judges
were thus slower and more accurate than Nosek and his colleagues'
subjects, and overall, the application of their criteria eliminated fewer
judges than their results would have predicted.
Unlike Nosek and his colleagues, 176 we did not randomize the
order in which we presented the IAT. That is, roughly half of the
participants in the Internet sample receive the stereotype-congruent
round first, while half receive the stereotype-incongruent round first.
The seven-round IAT is designed to reduce order effects substantially,
but nevertheless, they remain. Greenwald and his colleagues report
that the IAT scores can correlate weakly with the order in which the
materials are presented. 177 Randomizing the order would have pro-
duced a cleaner measure of the IAT effect across all judges, but would
have reduced the correlation between the LAT score and behavior.' 78
Hence, all of ourjudges received the materials in the same order. On
the race IAT, judges receive the stereotype-congruent pairing first
(white/good and black/bad) and on the gender IAT, judges receive
the stereotype-incongruent pairing first (male/humanities and
female/science). Our procedure would have tended to increase the
IAT score on the race IAT, as compared to the sample by Nosek and
his colleagues, and decrease the TAT score on the gender IAT.
By using these procedures, we scored judges in exactly the same
method as Nosek and his colleagues in the data that they harvested
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 210 tbl.2, report the effect of order with a
correlation coefficient, rather than a mean or percent difference. They report that
the correlation varies with the IAT, noting that the gender IAT that we used here
produces a higher correlation between order and LAT score than do other IATs. They
report correlations as high as 0.29 (depending upon the scoring method), which
would mean that order can account for up to ten percent of the 1AT score. Id. By
contrast, the race TAT that we used produces small correlations with order, ranging
from 0.002 to 0.054; thus, order accounts for, at most, one-quarter of one percent of
the 1AT score. The order effects seem to vary with context, and hence we cannot be
certain of the extent of the influence of order on our materials.
178 Had we randomized the order, each judge's JAT score would have varied with
the order to some extent. This would have introduced some variation to the IAT
score that would inherently reduce the correlation we observed across alljudges. Our
measure of the IAT score across all judges would have been more reliable had we
randomized, but the IAT score for the individual judges would have been less consis-
tent, thereby interfering with the correlation.
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from the Internet. Because laboratory data are obviously different in
some respects, we only treated the data this way for purposes of com-
parison with the Internet samples, and not for assessing the correla-
tion between the IAT scores and the decisions that judges made. For
the correlations, we calculated a standardized score.
2. Standardized IAT Score Calculation
To calculate the standardized IAT score, we followed the proce-
dures recommended by Greenwald and his colleagues.179 These
researchers designed their methods precisely to improve the reliability
and predictive power of their measures.180 We use the methods that
produced the highest correlations between implicit measures and
behavioral measures. They differ from the scoring method used to
calculate the mean differences. As noted above, we used the Green-
wald methodology to collect the IAT scores. 18' Following those scor-
ing procedures, we removed single trials with latencies greater than
10,000 ms (that is, ten seconds) from the analysis. We otherwise left
low and high values in the analysis without adjustment. We made no
correction for errors, because our IAT collection methods required
the judges to provide the correct response before proceeding and
hence the latency includes the delay that would result from an incor-
rect answer. Error rates were also low, as noted above. Following
Greenwald and his colleagues' scoring method, we used all of the tri-
als, rather than dropping the first two in the round.
We departed from the method Greenwald and his colleagues
endorse, however, in one respect. Those researchers suggested using
the two paired practice rounds (rounds three and six) in the analy-
sis.182 They reported that using this data produced slightly higher cor-
relations between the IAT scores and explicit choices.18 3 We found,
however, that latencies in the practice rounds were highly erratic. A
high percentage of the trials eliminated for being greater than 10,000
ms were in the trial rounds. 184 Even with these observations removed,
the average standard deviation in the two practice rounds on the race
179 Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 199-200.
180 Id.
181 In the eastern and western samples we reduced the number of trials in the
practice rounds (rounds 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) from twenty to sixteen, so as to save time.
182 Greenwald et al., supra note 29, at 213.
183 Id. at 214-15.
184 In the race IAT, twenty-nine out of the thirty-three instances in which judges
produced latency scores of greater than 10,000 ms on a trial (or 87.9%) occurred
during the practice rounds. In the gender IAT, the two instances in which judges
exhibited trials that exceeded 10,000 ms occurred in the target round.
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IAT was over one second (1064 ms), as compared to 596 ms in the
trial rounds. This suggested to us that we ought not to use the prac-
tice rounds in the analysis. The practice rounds of the gender IAT
were more stable. The standard deviation from the practice rounds
(724 ms) was much closer to that of the trial rounds (560 ms). Even
though the practice rounds in the gender IAT seemed more stable,
for consistency, we dropped these as well. Our measure of the IAT
effect for purposes of correlating the IAT scores with judges' decisions
was therefore the average difference between the stereotype-congru-
ent round and the stereotype-incongruent round divided by the stan-
dard deviation of latencies in both rounds combined. Following
Greenwald and his colleagues, we call the measure d'.
Because the latencies that we observed seemed slower than those
which have been observed in the Internet study, we assessed the corre-
lation between our two IAT measures and the mean latency. The cor-
relation coefficients between the mean differences and the overall
latency were 0.305 on the race IAT and 0.361 on the gender IAT.
These correlations are high enough to indicate that our judges have
higher IAT scores than other populations simply because they were
somewhat slower. 18 5 The standardized IAT measure using only the
trial rounds, however, produced correlations of only 0.046 and 0.002
with the overall mean latencies for the race and sex IATs, respectively.
Hence, the d' measure provided a much more reliable measure of the
TAT effect than the mean difference.
185 Note that these correlations used all judges, with no exclusions for speed, did
not bound the data between 300 and 3000 Ins, and did not exclude the first two
rounds, as we did for calculating the mean differences.
